Page - 125 - in VULNERABLE - The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19

125Resisting the Siren’s Call: Emergency Powers, Federalism, and Public Policy competencies.43 For example, the ability of the Canada Revenue Agency to design and distribute the CERB to some seven million Canadians in just a few weeks is directly related to the expertise it has developed under the federal taxation power. Conversely, provinces have been delivering health care and ordering private relationships for over a century.44 It would take considerable time for the federal government to create comparable systems.45 Indeed, an ongoing emergency may be the worst time to attempt such a transformation. The differential expertise is compounded by the fact that emer- gency powers are temporary. Sometimes, that will be sufficient, as with, say, a short-term scheme for rent relief or nationwide testing. Other problems require more durable solutions. The pandemic has high- lighted long-standing issues of social inequality and political powerless- ness. While seniors, for example, may have more acute needs because of COVID-19, those needs predate and will long outlast the virus. That does not, necessarily, argue against short-term relief. But Parliament cannot address such vulnerabilities on an ongoing basis. Absent a con- stitutional amendment, as was done for old age pensions,46 Parliament cannot federalize long-term care homes or their workers. The fact that such control will eventually cede to the provinces is an important factor in assessing the utility of intervention. That factor is only heightened when one considers the second risk of emergency legislation. That risk is the likelihood of provincial push-back. The federal- provincial relationship rarely runs smoothly.47 The depth of current 43. 114957  Canada  Ltée  (Spraytech,  Société  d’arrosage)  v  Hudson  (Town), 2001 SCC 40 at para 3; see also Alexandra Flynn, this volume, Chapter A-8. 44. To be sure, the federal government does have some expertise in health care, including providing sevices to the military and Indigenous persons, as well as regulating drug and medical devices safety. 45. For a similar argument, see David Robitaille, this volume, Chapter A-4: “Nous voyons mal comment ces mesures pourraient être centralisées entre les mains du gouvernement fédéral qui ne dispose pas toujours de la proximité et des con- naissances suffisantes pour agir efficacement sur le plan micro-territorial, d’où l’importance d’institutions provinciales et locales fortes.” 46. Constitution  Act,  1867, supra note 5, s 94A. 47. Several provinces have launched constitutional references about the validity of the 2018 Greenhouse  Gas  Pollution  Pricing  Act, which mandates a national fuel charge and enacts performance standards for large industrial facilities. There have also been difficult disagreements over the Trans Mountain Pipeline expansion and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Carissima Mathen, “Carbon Tax Court References a Chapter in Fed-Prov Power Struggle” (23 May 2019), online: Policy  Options  <https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/ may-2019/carbon-tax-court-references-chapter-fed-prov-power-struggle/>;