Page - 147 - in VULNERABLE - The Law, Policy and Ethics of COVID-19

147Ensuring Executive and Legislative Accountability in a Pandemic Parliament as Accountability Check Discussions of Parliament’s role in holding the executive to account tend to begin with what happens in the Senate and House of Commons and in parliamentary committees. There is good reason for this: these are the primary fora for public scrutiny of legislation and executive action.22 However, they are not the only sites of accountability in our political system. In the context of the current pandemic, it is important to look beyond these fora to consider what additional role less visible forms of oversight might be playing. Before adjourning in mid-March at the beginning of the pan- demic, the House of Commons expedited the passage of legislation authorizing the executive to spend without prior parliamentary approval for a period of three and a half months.23 It did so by means of the “unanimous consent” procedure. This procedure permits the House “to depart from, vary or abridge the rules it has made for itself” where there is unanimous support for use of a different proce- dure.24 The House of Commons used this procedure to adopt a motion deeming the bill to have been passed at each stage rather than going through the usual three-reading process for the adoption of legisla- tion.25 As Thomas explains, “[t]here was no debate on the merits of the motion, and the motion was adopted before the text of C-12 was presented to the House of Commons.”26 The legislation passed in the Senate on the same day.27 Parliament has since enacted four further pieces of COVID-19- related legislation. These bills were also passed with dispatch. The 22. See Jonathan Malloy, “The Adaptation of Parliament’s Multiple Roles to COVID- 19” Can J Political Science [forthcoming in 2020]. 23. Bill C-12, An Act to Amend the Financial Administration Act (special warrant), 1st Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020. See generally Thomas, “Parliament Under Pressure”, supra note 5. 24. Marc Bosc & André Gagnon, eds, House of Commons Procedure and Practice, 3rd ed (Ottawa: House of Commons, 2017) at Chapter 12, online: House of Commons Canada <www.ourcommons.ca/About/ProcedureAndPractice3rdEdition/ch_12_5-e. html>; Thomas, “Parliament Under Pressure”, supra note 5. Interestingly, some of the motions adopted by unanimous consent since the outset of the pandemic have signalled agreement on procedure but not on substance. For example, the March 24 unanimous consent motion in the House of Commons was adopted on division: see House of Commons Debates, 43-1, Vol 149, No 32 (24 March 2020) [Hansard 24 March 2020]. 25. See Thomas, “Parliament Under Pressure”, supra note 5. 26. For the precise details, see Thomas, “Parliament Under Pressure”, ibid. 27. Senate of Canada, Debates of the Senate, 43-1, Vol 151, No 17 (13 March 2020).