Seite - 17 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Ballhausplatz and the Deficit of War 17 out in particular. Since the Habsburg Monarchy lay on the periphery of a collapsing large empire, its foreign policy was oriented towards specific regions. However, it was clear that the spoils to be won also brought with them all the problems that had be- leaguered the Turks. The collapse or merely the threat of dissolution of a large empire always brings substantial fallout in its wake, since those who have a stabilising effect and who wish to retain an empire are by nature in conflict with those who wish to profit from its disintegration.11 This was the case with the Ottoman Empire, as it would be later with Austria-Hungary, the collapsing major power in the Danube region. The Habsburg Monarchy made strenuous efforts to counteract its fall, but perhaps it was precisely this almost compulsive attempt to break out of the disastrous circle that gave a hectic and sometimes unpredictable quality to Austro-Hungarian policy.12 The foreign policy of the Monarchy reached the limits of its effectiveness whenever a conflict of interests occurred with those countries that portrayed themselves as dynamic, impe- rialist major powers, in other words, particularly when Great Britain, France and the German Empire came into play. The same was also true when a rival for the Turkish legacy, namely Tsarist Russia, made its intentions clear, and when medium-sized and small states began to seek expansion and make efforts to push through their demands. This applied above all to Italy and also to Serbia. That their interaction and rivalry is one of the causes of the outbreak of war is undisputed. How else can the reactions to certain events, the alliance politics and ultimately the goals that lay behind the war be explained ? The foundations for war were laid primarily in the Balkans. While on several occa- sions, there were fears that war would break out against Russia, or that the Habsburg Monarchy would be drawn into a war between Germany and France, the tensions be- tween Austria-Hungary and Germany on the one hand and Russia on the other, as well as the strained relations between Germany and France, lacked the spontaneous aggressiveness and irrational behaviour that was manifest in the Balkans. There, the situation overall was volatile and unstable. When in 1908 the Austro-Hungarian For- eign Minister Baron Aloys Lexa von Aehrenthal bound the Monarchy to a more ac- tive foreign policy, thus revising the policy of his predecessor, the Polish count Agenor Gołuchowski, the level of disorder in the structural fabric of the Balkans increased dramatically. As presidential head at the Foreign Ministry, then as ambassador first to Bucharest and finally from 1899 to 1906 to St. Petersburg, Aehrenthal had been in a position to gather a wealth of experience and insight, and the policy that he began appeared at first sight to be neither particularly illogical nor exciting. At best, it was received with surprise.13 In 1878, the Congress of Berlin had given Austria-Hungary a mandate to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria also obtained the right to oc- cupy an area known as the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, which lay between Serbia and the principality of Montenegro in the west of the Balkan Peninsula. Austria-Hungary was