Seite - 23 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

 The Powder Keg 23 step of signing an alliance and with Russian agreement and assistance set about creat- ing a Balkan League. Serbia was clearly aiming to increase its power and received broad support for its ambitions. Conrad once again accused Aehrenthal of being opposed to a pre-emptive war in 1909. On 18 July 1911, Conrad wrote to the Foreign Minister : ‘I cannot forbear, to return to the position that I have always held, that a war fought years ago would have rendered our military position regarding our undertakings in the Bal- kans significantly more favourable, and that a war against Serbia in the year 1909 would, with a single stroke, have brought the Monarchy to the position in the Balkans that it must assume, and which must now be achieved under far more difficult conditions than those that prevailed at that time.’19 This statement, which was preceded and would be followed by numerous others of its kind, was made not only in response to the case of Serbia but was also an unequivocal reference to the deficit of war. Several times, Aehrenthal tendered his resignation, not least due to his conflict with Conrad. The Emperor rejected his requests, and reassured his minister that he enjoyed his full confidence. Thus, Aehrenthal, who was suffering from advanced leukaemia and was already nearing death, remained in office and continued to resist demands for a pre-emptive war by the War Party with great vehemence. Even when Conrad was tem- porarily recalled from his post as Chief of the General Staff in December 1911 and replaced for almost a year by General of the Infantry Blasius Schemua, the ‘pre-emp- tive warriors’ intensified their criticism of the Foreign Ministry. In any case, Schemua was also of the opinion that ‘an active foreign policy targeted towards expansion’ was the ‘best cure’ for the domestic stagnation and national signs of decomposition in the Habsburg Monarchy.20 And yet why wage war when it could be avoided ? Aehrenthal’s stance also influenced his close colleagues, of whom Count János Forgách, the minister’s chief of staff, Count Friedrich Szápáry, Count Ottokar Czernin, and Baron Alexander von Musulin and Count Alexander Hoyos were particularly intent on propagating the views of their superior. With little success, as would become clear in 1914. Aehrenthal’s policy was also supported throughout by Archduke Franz Ferdinand, although perhaps with an even greater emphasis on the avoidance of war.21 In mid-February 1912, the cards were re-shuffled. Aehrenthal died. Due to his se- vere illness, a search had already been underway for his successor for some time. Some- one was needed who had experience with Russia. Here, there were many candidates to choose from. However, a guarantee that Aehrenthal’s policy would be continued was also required, and also that the new foreign minister, who was also minister of the imperial household, would fit well into the difficult constellation at court and in the circles of power. This reduced the number of suitable potential successors significantly. The nomination of Count Leopold Berchtold, who had arranged the meeting at Bu- chlovice and who had experienced the annexation crisis of 1908 as ambassador in St. Petersburg, appeared to be a logical decision in the light of these premises.22 Berchtold