Seite - 59 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The ‘entire armed force’ 59 of lieutenant-colonel or colonel and regimental commander upwards was one better off. Earnings in the German army were roughly twice as much as in the Imperial and Royal Army. Around 70 per cent of subalterns were not married, as they were not sufficiently wealthy in order to pay the exorbitantly high marriage deposits demanded as security for a possible widow’s pension and the provision for old age. It was an open secret that many things were in a sorry state here and one only had to look at the sinking number of officer cadets to be concerned. The number of pupils at the 19 officer academies decreased from 3,333 in 1897 to 1,864 in 1913 and at the Theresian Military Academy only 134 lieutenants were mustered in 1913.112 The difficulty of obtaining the officer re- cruits needed led almost inevitably to the requirements being lowered. No-one wanted to admit this, but the results were visible during the war. For a young officer who commenced his service with a regiment, the training of the enlisted men was the main focal point alongside the breaking in. This presupposed the necessary language skills. At the Maria Theresa Military Academy in the city of Wiener Neustadt and at the Technical Military Academy in Vienna, the trainee officers had to learn two languages of the Dual Monarchy aside from German, and in addition French. Around half the officers of the Common Army could speak Czech in addition to German  – which may come as a surprise.113 The cadet academies set somewhat more modest requirements, not least in the case of language training. Nevertheless, in Poland, for example, one could still fail in the event that one had learned Polish but the enlisted men spoke Ruthenian or a dialect or the language of a minority such as Hucul, Goral or Lemko. Occasionally, a sort of military jargon was useful. When all else failed, how- ever, the non-commissioned officers had to take over the teaching of the lesson. In the Common Army 80 orders were given in German and the rest of the communication had to take place in the so-called ‘regimental language’. An officer in a regiment using an idiom he was not familiar with had to prove to a committee within the space of three years following commencement of his duties that he was proficient in the regimental language. If this was not the case and a grace period was of no use, then the appraisal of the officer in question would contain the words ‘at present not suitable for promotion’. Officers and enlisted men also differed fundamentally in their expectations, for whilst the possibility of a war was at most on the periphery of the latter’s thoughts, it took centre stage for the ‘payee’ (Gagist), for he was a career officer and could expect the opportunity to prove himself and win promotion and decorations in the event of war. War was both a career opportunity and a big adventure. As an instrument of foreign policy, for many years the Austro-Hungarian troops only played a role where there was a potential threat. This was in contrast to domestic policy, where they were deployed. Whilst in non-German countries the use of the mil- itary during the course of political interventions repeatedly and frequently took place in the context of the nationalities problem, such operations were conducted in the Ger-