Seite - 76 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

76 Two Million Men for the War The German Empire willingly allowed itself to be embroiled, for it had not achieved the long sought-after equilibrium with England, aside from the agreement on naval arma- ments, but on the other hand believed that, if in possession of its full military strength, it could use this strength to force through its policies. Additionally, in Germany there was a different fundamental attitude than in Austria-Hungary. The arms race, the feel- ing of being encircled and diverse cases of rabble-rousing on the part of the press contributed to creating tension and a feeling that a general European ‘conflagration’ would be unavoidable in the near future. Germany found itself  – in Moltke’s words  – in a ‘position of hopeless isolation, which was growing ever more hopeless’, but believed that it had the strength to break out. Perhaps the experience of the Triple Alliance, which, as discussed, exhibited clear weaknesses, contributed to the German Empire indulging in countless illusions re- garding the sturdiness of the ‘Entente Cordiale’ between France and Great Britain. On the other hand, the functioning of the Franco-Russian collaboration was accepted as a certainty. A war was almost exclusively seen, therefore, as a two-front conflict, whereas Vienna continued to devote most of its thoughts to an isolated war in the Balkans. German historians have argued in this context that Germany jumped, as it were, on the Balkan bandwagon in order either to meet its main opponents, France and Russia, via this detour or to provoke them in such a way that a war would be inevitable.158 This objective, they argued, had been fixed since the famous war council of 8 July 1912, and Berlin had simply been waiting for the opportunity to realise an objective that had been planned long before. The reasons for this stance, the German historians continued, were to be found in a series of economic-strategic setbacks, as the German Empire regarded itself as having been eliminated by French capital both in the construction of the Bagh- dad Railway and in the granting of loans to Russia. It was reasoned from this that the German encouragement of Austrian policy in the Balkans ultimately resulted in unleashing the very same crisis whose realisation in a direct confrontation with France did not appear advisable, since it would inevitably have brought Great Britain into play. It was thus imperative that the aim should be to achieve Great Britain’s neutrality in a European conflict.159 This interpretation was vehemently contradicted by others be- cause German policy, as they claimed, was not made by a few bankers and merchants.160 The feeling of gradual stagnation also led Germany to engage in thoughts of a pre-emptive war. Again, not only Germany itself but also Austria-Hungary played a role here. The Chief of the German General Staff Helmuth von Moltke regarded the military strength of the two Central Powers as one whole. Considering Russian ar- maments, but above all with regard to the apparently so inhomogeneous Imperial and Royal Army, Moltke perceived that circumstances were deteriorating increasingly for the Central Powers. He regarded it as highly doubtful that Austria-Hungary would in the near future be in a position in the event of a war to engage in a strong offensive