Seite - 93 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The July Crisis 93 1913, and that an outbreak had only been avoided when Serbia had backed down at the last minute. Berchtold’s decisions were also based to no small degree on disappointment. He had after all hoped to be able to stabilise the situation in the Balkans, and had until June 1914 been optimistic that an agreement could be reached with Serbia. Now, he had failed, and indeed, felt that he had been humiliated. His policy to date could be interpreted as being weak. This time, he was disinclined to show weakness once again. There were others, such as Conrad, who also brought their experiences to bear. For the Chief of the General Staff, the Balkans were associated with the only experience of war that he had been able to gain thus far, since he had been involved as a second lieu- tenant in the campaign of occupation in 1878. Thus, Conrad was able to draw on ex- periences gained at the beginning of his career. He now regarded the unfolding events as a confirmation of what he had been claiming for years : that the Monarchy must initiate a war at the earliest possible opportunity against Serbia, Italy, and  – if it were to become necessary  – even a civil war against Hungary. War scenario ‘U’ (for ‘Ungarn’, or ‘Hungary’) had in the interim been shelved, but the others were still relevant. While Conrad recognised that the ideal point in time for taking revenge action against Serbia had already passed, the problem now might still be tackled. For him, the decisive issue was whether or not Russia already felt itself sufficiently strong to enter the war as pro- tector of Serbia. Until 1913, Conrad had hoped that an intervention by Russia could be ruled out, while in his annual memorandum for 1914, he already anticipated that the Tsarist Empire would act.194 The fact that Biliński and Potiorek were in favour of war is hardly surprising, since both bore their share of the blame for the success of the Sara- jevo attack. Potiorek in particular was accused of gross neglect in failing to protect the heir to the throne. For Biliński, and for the head of the civil and military administration of Bosnia, the decisions taken at the Ballhausplatz and by the Emperor on war or peace thus had an additional, highly personal quality. Attempts have been made to study the psychological factors of the July Crisis and how they affected Austria-Hungary, and the unsurprising conclusion has been reached that those in positions of authority were suffering from unimaginable stress.195 The pressure on each individual was certainly enormous, since the task they faced was not only to take some form of action, but to act correctly. They also had expectations to fulfil. And none of them was at first entirely sure of the Emperor’s genuine reaction to the murders. However, it can be assumed that no unpremeditated actions were taken, or that bad decisions were taken as a result of stress. Quite the opposite : it is striking just how cool and calculated those involved were. For example, Minister Berchtold read daily press reviews in order to keep up to date with reporting trends. Ultimately, they only confirmed his views, and he had no need to alter his decisions in line with the leading articles of the daily newspapers. However, on the day after he had expressed his