Seite - 95 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The July Crisis 95 himself with the documents.199 He intended to use the opportunity to deliver a series of personal messages in order to provide as much detailed information as possible on the current assessment of the situation by the Ballhausplatz, and for his part, to gather information on the attitude of the German Kaiser and the imperial government. Until this point, Vienna had known almost nothing about the prevailing attitude in Berlin. Kaiser Wilhelm II and Prince Heinrich had not attended the funeral of Franz Ferdinand. The German ambassador, Baron Heinrich von Tschirschky, had shown no- table reserve. He had still received no instructions, and only said to Berchtold that to begin a war without being certain that Italy and Romania would not enter on the side of Serbia ‘appears to be a very hazardous undertaking’.200 Von Tschirschky reported to Berlin that he had used every possible opportunity to ‘warn in calm but unmistakeable and serious terms against taking overhasty steps’  – a classic formulation for a diplo- mat. Indeed, there were numerous and important individuals within Germany who were calling for moderation. However, they remained in the minority, and the criticism voiced by the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper of the war hysteria in the Vi- ennese press was an exception.201 Pressure was then immediately brought to bear on the Frankfurter, and from 4 July onwards, all the German civilian press struck a harsh, anti-Serbian tone.202 Hoyos arrived in Berlin on Sunday, 5 July. He first delivered the documents to the Austro-Hungarian ambassador, Count László Szögyény and gave him information. He then met the deputy secretary in the German Foreign Office, Arthur Zimmermann, who apparently claimed that war would be 90 per cent likely if the Monarchy decided to take action against Serbia.203 Hoyos assured Zimmermann that the Monarchy was by no means prepared to ac- cept the murder of the heir to the throne without acting. To this, Zimmermann literally replied : ‘[…] we have in fact been rather afraid that this might be the case.’ In the after- noon, the prepared documents were handed to Kaiser Wilhelm. He studied them, but instead of discussing them with only political representatives, chose to include Gustav von Krupp, who spoke for the armaments industry. When asked by the Kaiser whether German industry would be in a position to survive even a large war on several fronts, he answered with a clear ‘Yes’. Count Hoyos also met with the Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, as well as with the permanent secretary in the Foreign Office, von Jagow, who had apparently returned to Berlin from his honeymoon, as well as again with Zimmermann. On this occasion, the Balkan memorandum written by the Foreign Ministry in Vienna was discussed, which did not correlate with the German concept, particularly with regard to the passages relating to Romania. However, in reality, the statement that Romania would no longer side with the Central Powers in the event of war would not have come as a surprise. King Carol had even given official notice of the fact on 2 July, just a few days after the assassination, that the country did not intend