Seite - 97 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The July Crisis 97 not a single attempt of any significance was made to address the issue with Italy. Clearly, it was felt to be preferable to risk the prospect that Italy would invoke the Triple Alli- ance agreement and remain on the sidelines. During the days that followed, discussions were held and actions were taken in Vi- enna and Berlin both in parallel and independently of each other before being finally interconnected. The political and, above all, military strategy in Vienna remained fo- cussed on the problem of Serbia, and the only other area of interest was the issue of the Russian position. By contrast, in Berlin the prospect of a wider war was under consid- eration. This war was envisaged on a European scale, and was therefore planned with a very different approach to the isolated ‘Third Balkan War’ for which the policymakers in the Imperial and Royal Empire were preparing. In the German Empire, the Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg, was the most influential person when it came to taking political decisions. In Austria-Hungary, it was Berchtold who played the key role, as did Tisza to a certain extent. Of course, they were all by no means free to make their own decisions, Berchtold and Tisza per- haps even far less so than Bethmann Hollweg, although they played a very active part in the process. German historians, particularly Fritz Fischer, Imanuel Geiß, Egmont Zechlin, Karl-Friedrich Erdmann and Andreas Hillgruber, have pointed to the role of the close confidante of Bethmann Hollweg, Kurt Riezler.207 His diaries have been regarded as key documents in understanding the decision-making process in the circles surrounding the German Imperial Chancellor. Riezler was and still is a good example of the mode of thinking in July 1914. The German was convinced of the fateful nature of war, sounding a chord that resonated with Social Darwinist thinking. Indeed, the role played by fundamental Social Darwinist principles in both Germany and Aus- tria-Hungary during the July Crisis should not be underestimated. In both states, the basic formula on which these principles were based, namely that the stronger consume the weaker, and that a decisive showdown was inevitable, was widely accepted. The ‘pre-emptive war club’ was composed of Social Darwinists. For that reason, Rie- zler’s views on the necessity of military armament could also have originated from Conrad von Hötzendorf, and were nothing other than a ‘modern form of deferment’ of armed conflict.208 ‘Supremacy is the goal, not so much as to be in a position to fight a successful war, but rather to conceive of it, and to have the enemy conceive of it, too’. Bluffing became the key requisite of diplomacy. Stagnating major powers in particular found it necessary to fend off their enemies through diplomatic manoeuvring and to gain time by applying the bluff theory. Accordingly, if a group that was hampered by a stagnant major power were to avoid all risk of war, those powers that were in a position to make time work in their favour, would inevitably triumph.209 However, Riezler then pursued a very different line of reasoning to Conrad or any other Austrian Social Darwinist. In his view, the dynamic of the increase in Russian