Seite - 100 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

100 Bloody Sundays of the meeting : ‘specific demands have been made on Serbia, these demands have been refused, and an ultimatum has been presented’. However, all participants in the Council of Ministers agreed that the specific demands on Serbia should be formulated in such a manner that only a rejection would be possible, and that therefore, a ‘radical solution in the form of military intervention would be forthcoming.’214 Despite his agreement in principle on sending a démarche to Serbia, Tisza felt it necessary to explain his position to the Emperor the following day. Ultimately, the Hungarian Prime Minister was aware of the fact that his opinion also differed from that of his monarch. His letter, which Berchtold took with him to an audience with the Emperor in Bad Ischl on 9 July, and which he read out to him, was therefore an apol- ogy and an explanation in equal measure. The démarche, said Tisza, could only serve to assign blame for a war to Serbia, ‘which has burdened itself with the risk of war by abstaining, even after the atrocity in Sarajevo, from honestly fulfilling the obligations of a decent neighbour.’ This was meant literally, and did not ultimately contradict the procedure that the Emperor had wanted to pursue. However, Tisza went further : ‘In order to avoid an embroilment with Italy, to secure the sympathy of England and to enable Russia to remain a spectator in the war, we must for our part at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner issue a declaration that we do not wish to destroy Serbia, still less to annex it. After a satisfactory end to the war, it would namely in my view be advisable to reduce the size of Serbia by ceding its conquered territories to Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, while for ourselves, to demand at the most certain strategically important border regulations. Naturally, we would have the right to claim compensation for the war costs, which would provide us with a lever to keep Serbia under firm control for a long period of time.’215 Tisza, who had criticised Hoyos for the statements he had made in Berlin, ultimately said precisely the same thing as the chief of staff of the Foreign Minister. However, it was the Hungarian prime minister who prevented earlier action against Serbia, and who allowed the July Crisis to become what it remains to this day : incomprehensible. In the meantime, the Foreign Ministry was able to go on as before : purposefully and cautiously. The Austrian envoy in Belgrade, Baron Wladimir von Giesl, was in France at the time of the assassination. Rather than returning straight to Belgrade, he headed first for Vienna in order to receive instructions before reporting his departure to Berchtold after the Joint Council of Ministers on 7 July. He was given a succinct directive : ‘How- ever the Serbs react, you must break off relations and leave the country : war is surely coming.’216 On the day after the Joint Council of Ministers, Berchtold surprised the Chief of the General Staff with the suggestion that he and War Minister Krobatin should go on holiday for a certain period of time in order to make it appear to the general public that nothing was amiss. Although the Emperor disagreed, and demanded that holidays be