Seite - 106 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

106 Bloody Sundays ble approach could discredit our position with Germany’, and in principle, the decisive factor was being able to exert control over Serbia in practice.232 Everyone feared that the other could give in and ‘become weak’. Thoughts continued to focus only on war, and the German Empire also persistently pressed for war. Ambassador von Tschirschky now be- gan to issue continuous warnings and convey messages from Berlin that all, in countless variations, demanded the same thing of Vienna : war, and as quickly as possible ! In the interim, the resistance of the most prominent opponent of war, the Hungarian Prime Minister Count Tisza, had also evaporated. On 19 July, he agreed during the next Joint Council of Ministers to the dispatch of the note of request containing the demands on Serbia, and only wanted reassurance that no territorial demands on Serbia would be made. Here, Tisza also showed flexibility, when for example he regarded the separation of Ada Kaleh, a small island in the Danube near the Iron Gates, and other minor strategic border adjustments as fully appropriate. A further proposal suggested that Serbia be divided among other Balkan states. Perhaps Romania, Bulgaria and Greece would wish to take advantage of this opportunity, and would therefore support Austria-Hungary’s position and possibly also enter the war against Serbia. The Austrian Prime Minister, Count Stürgkh, also raised the possibility that the Serbian dynasty could be deposed. At any rate, there was unanimous agreement that the note of request should be sent to Serbia as soon as possible, and that it would have to be worded in such a manner that acceptance by Belgrade would be impossible.233 Item 6 was intended as the trap into which Belgrade would almost inevitably walk. In the Hungarian Council of Ministers, the modalities for conscripting the Land- sturm (reserve forces) were discussed and a recommendation sent to the Emperor.234 Again, one step further had been taken towards war, although outwardly, nothing had changed. By now, however, the opportunity had forever been lost of exploiting the shock generated by the murder of Franz Ferdinand as a chance to attack Serbia in a spontaneous reaction. In Berlin, there was an initial discussion as to whether by attack- ing Serbia quickly, Austria-Hungary could precipitate the capitulation of Serbia in a very short time due to its evident military superiority, with Russia and France entirely incapable of intervening. Then, it would be advantageous for Germany to act as medi- ator and bring Vienna to the negotiating table. In this way, the calculated risk would have paid off and a limited goal would have been achieved in the spirit of Riezler’s bluff theory, without having started a major war. As a result, Austria-Hungary, the remaining stagnating major power, would perhaps have reached a point at which it could over- come its weakness and together with the German Empire make strong progress. Yet now, the moment of surprise had been missed, and with its passing, the probability of intervention by Russia and France became more likely. However, from the moment when it became clear to Berlin that Russia had recov- ered from the shock and had returned to its former policy of supporting Serbia, the