Seite - 108 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

108 Bloody Sundays applied to Serbia. This then led the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Sazonov, to tell Count Friedrich von Szápáry that ‘Europe should not impede Austria in its dispute with Serbia […] Certainly, the provocations of Serbia, as a result of which Europe has now already been brought to the brink of war for the third time within the space of five years’ must be stopped once and for all.237 However, what statements like this actually meant in reality was difficult to assess, always on the assumption that they re- ally were rendered correctly by Szápáry or whoever else received them. The diplomatic reports during the July Crisis clearly reflect the range of different sentiments that were prevalent : boundless pacifism and, to an equal degree, bellicose posturing, the desire to attempt a diplomatic solution at any price, and the resigned opinion that nothing more could be done. Hardly anyone held back from offering half-truths and, when no other option was available, from lying outright. It was almost as though preparations were even now being made to colour the way in which the situation would subsequently be portrayed, and to ensure that later, the blame would incontrovertibly be placed else- where. Certainly, several governments in Europe were fully expecting Austria-Hungary to prepare a harsh démarche to send to Belgrade. The German ambassador at the court of St. James’s, Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky, informed the London Foreign Office that Austria-Hungary was planning something against Serbia. France, Russia and Serbia were immediately informed. In Rome, there was an awareness that action was being planned, even though the wording of the démarche was not known. Again, the in- formation came from Berlin. The British ambassador in Vienna, Maurice de Bunsen, reported to London on 16 July that on the previous day, he had learned from an in- formant what was being prepared.238 Count Heinrich Lützow, the former Imperial and Royal ambassador in Rome, was the source of the information. However, Sir Maurice had other good sources elsewhere. The Russians knew about the Viennese ‘war factory’, and received from their allies any information that their cryptographers were unable to provide.239 In the end, everyone knew that everyone knew. Ultimately, it also prob- ably no longer mattered that somebody knew the exact wording of the note destined for Serbia. It was evident that in Vienna, steps were being taken towards war, and this knowledge led to a bout of shadow-boxing in London, Paris, Rome, St. Petersburg and Belgrade. However, the British government still believed it was possible to avert the disaster and took up the ‘pledge theory’ that was clearly widely supported at the time : if Austria-Hungary were to attack Serbia, then it would be sufficient, in the view of London and subsequently also Paris, if the Imperial and Royal armies were to obtain a pledge, for example Belgrade, in order to then negotiate from a position of strength and be able to dictate peace terms to the Serbs.240 The ‘halt in Belgrade’ became a key factor of British policy.241 However, who would want to act as guarantor that Europe would stand by while Imperial and Royal troops occupied Belgrade ? When was that