Seite - 111 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The July Crisis 111 ultimatum that had been written about two weeks previously. The Serbian government was given a period of 48 hours to fully accept the demands. Let us take another look at the time factor. The démarche had been agreed on 7 July, and was in essence ready for delivery on 12 July. Directly afterwards, its contents were reported to Berlin, though not with the final wording. In the light of the calculations made regarding the date, it was already recommended at this point in time that the note should not be presented until 25 July due to the visit to St. Petersburg by Poincaré. Kaiser Wilhelm wrote a marginal note  – one of his many comments  – on the dispatch informing him of the delay : ‘What a pity !’246 During the days that followed, the text of the note was perfected, while at the same time, diplomatic activity continued at many different levels. Naturally, the most important representatives of the press were also in- formed. On 16 July, the head of department, Count Forgách, called in the editor of Die Presse, Moriz Benedikt, explained to him the reasons for waiting, and already outlined the contents of the démarche. He mentioned the ‘harsh terms’, including #investiga- tion and punishment of the guilty parties and similar demands’. Benedikt noted that according to Forgách, ‘It would have been better if we could have got going at once’, but as was the case with other countries in comparable situations, it would have been necessary to achieve mobilisation immediately and demands would have had to be made under the pressure of this mobilisation. ‘However, we did not want to start mo- bilising, since we have already done so twice before. Each time, the costs amounted to many hundreds of millions, and then no fighting occurred. We cannot afford to spend so much money for a third time and to disappoint the army. This is absolutely out of the question. Although this is a major disadvantage, we do not wish to do otherwise, in order not to lose sympathy, particularly in England, which until now has not been unfavourably disposed towards us.’ When asked by Benedikt whether any consultations had been made with regard to a localisation of the war, Forgách replied : ‘No. We cannot talk about it, in order to avoid admitting in advance that we may possibly go to war. We believe that Russia is not sufficiently prepared to wage a war.’ This view was also held by Germany, he said, the same Germany ‘that is very keen to take action and is already prepared, now if necessary, to liquidate the global situation. However, we do not believe that Russia will enter the war, since we cannot envisage the Tsar declaring war at the grave of the slain Archduke. France is […] peaceable’, and anyway, ‘war is not inevitable. A peaceful end may also ensue. This cannot be precluded. They may indeed agree to all our demands. We shall not negotiate for long. Yet it is possible that they will agree to everything, and then naturally, a peaceful end will be achieved. However, the terms will be harsh.’ The ‘general opinion’, he said, was in favour of war. ‘The hope is that the matter will be cleared up, so that we can finally rid ourselves of our own timidity and show that we are still capable of achieving something.’ There was no question of terri- torial expansion, he said, but Serbia must ‘naturally repay the costs of the war’. Benedikt