Seite - 124 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

124 Unleashing the War hensible within the overall strategic context. The Imperial and Royal Military Adminis- tration could only initiate mobilisation under certain very precise circumstances, for not only was it required that the mobilisation would result in certain developments, which would in turn trigger countermeasures from those affected or from those states tied to alliances, but also that the mobilisation had to take place on the basis of very specific war scenarios. Conrad apparently refused to initiate preparatory mobilisation measures, as he, like many other soldiers, remembered only too well the consequences of the mobilisation of 1912. The Chief of the General Staff declared that ‘the army is so bitter as a result of the abortive mobilisation of 1912 that a mobilisation can only now be ordered if war is certain’.263 Regardless of this fact  – as will be shown  – preparations were indeed made. But only on the afternoon of 23 July was the army corps designated for the war against Serbia ordered to cease all exercises and to gather the regiments by the evening of 25 July at the latest in their peacetime garrisons.264 And these were only the preparations for a partial mobilisation. On the evening of 25 July there was a first certainty : Serbia had not conformed to Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum. From this moment on, every effort was made to trigger war. But there can be no question of Austria-Hungary being unprepared. How consist- ently it pursued its objective and how quickly the certainty spread that there would be war can be seen with the aid of several key Austrian documents.265 Two documents, or rather two groups of documents, can be utilised here. The first document is the proclamation of the Emperor ‘To My Peoples’. This manifesto was prepared parallel to the Serbian note of demands in the Foreign Ministry. It was com- pleted prior to 20 July and was passed on in strict confidence for the information of both prime ministers, Stürgkh and Tisza, on 21 July. Stürgkh then sent Berchthold a draft of a proclamation, which had been prepared a long time in advance in the office of the Imperial-Royal prime minister. As a comparison of the two texts shows, the For- eign Ministry did not take Stürgkh’s draft into consideration. This differed in the case of Tisza, who telegraphed his requests for alterations to Bad Ischl on 25 July, where Berchtold waited in order to implement all further steps with the Emperor once the 48-hour deadline granted to Serbia ran out. Tisza proposed two alterations that were then actually implemented. Finally, two further changes were made on the wishes of the Emperor. With that, the proclamation was ready. With the exception of these mi- nor alterations, however, the proclamation of war had been prepared long before the dispatch of the ultimatum to Serbia. Even prior to 20 July 1914 the following words had been formulated : ‘It was My most fervent wish to dedicate the years that might still be granted to Me by God’s grace to works of peace and to preserve My peoples from the great sacrifices and burdens of war. The council of providence has decided other- wise. […] With such forgetful ingratitude the Kingdom of Serbia, which from the first