Seite - 161 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

Deployment in Echelons and Packets 161 Russians had over five dual-track and four single-track lines and could send 260 trains daily to the deployment zones.372 Four railway lines led to the areas of the Monarchy bordering Serbia, on which 112 trains could transport troops, weapons and supply goods every day. Nationalisation had taken decades and  – as with the ‘Südbahn’  – had been impossible to complete.373 In 1914, all lines were to be used for the deployment and transportation of two million soldiers. Here, two requirements stood out. First, how would it be feasible to transport the troops to be mobilised from the interior of the Monarchy to its borders in the shortest possible time ? And second, how could the transport of civilians and supplies of all necessary goods to the hinterland be maintained ? It is almost superfluous to add that ultimately, finding an answer to the first question was paramount.374 The Law on War Contributions of 1912 required the transport companies to uphold the respective service and employment contracts for all employees (with the exception of those who were to be enlisted), in other words, to neither dismiss nor to retire them, and to put their relevant services at the disposal of the military.375 From this perspective, therefore, everything had been taken care of. However, the crucial point was that even in July 1914, it was still not clear how the transportation movements could be coordinated with each other. The greatest care was taken in planning a war against Russia. However, significant changes were made from one year to the next. If troops were deployed right up to the border of the Empire, the fear was that the Russians could interrupt this deployment through rapid advances by Cossack detachments. The next consideration related to Ro- mania. If this kingdom were not only to revoke its decades-long affiliation with the Central Powers, but instead, even to enter the war on the side of the Russians, there was a danger that Romanian troops could attack the flanks of the Austro-Hungarian formations. Conrad decided to set the deployment in Galicia further back to the San– Dniester line. The advantage appeared to be obvious : this ‘relocation to the rear’ would help accelerate the deployment, the armies could remain more concentrated, and the Russians would be forced to forge a path westward with heavy losses. The unavoidable consequence was the fact that initially this would necessarily entail the loss of parts of eastern Galicia. At any rate, in the view of the railway office of the General Staff, the relocation to the rear would also cause no problems. After all, this would mean that the trains would not have to be driven so far eastwards. A decisive factor for the calculations of the railway experts was only that the Imperial and Royal troops by necessity be at an increasing disadvantage compared to the Russians from the 15th day of mobilisation onwards, since the Russian forces would be superior at all times thanks to their bet- ter-developed railway network. The Austro-Hungarian railways were capable of carry- ing 153 trains to the deployment zones, while the Russians were in a position to run 260 trains (and more) daily. As a result, the plans were rapidly altered.