Seite - 168 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

168 ‘Thank God, this is the Great War!’ promptly ordered, although precisely in the way specified by the railway office. This also made it clear, however, that it was not Serbia, but Russia that would be the main enemy, and that as a result the mass of the Imperial and Royal armies, in other words, the A Echelon and the strategic reserve, the B Echelon, would have to deploy to the north-eastern front. Discussions were held until just before midnight, and particular heed was paid to the pressure from the German General Staff, which vehemently advocated making the Balkans a subsidiary theatre of war. Conrad had to decide. However, he was only too aware of what his supreme commander wanted  – to first bring down Serbia  – and also had a plausible argument to hand. According to the information given by the head of the railway office of the General Staff, Colonel Johann Straub, the railway system would no longer be able to cope if deployment to the Balkans were to be immediately broken off and the direction of the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army suddenly changed. It would also be of no benefit, since the troops destined for Galicia would arrive on time despite the detour via the Balkans.389 Not even those troops who were still waiting to be transported could be taken directly to Galicia, since this would cause formations and large army units to be torn apart, with one regiment of a brigade arriving in Serbia while the other was rolling towards Galicia, for example. Only more sections of two divisions could be redirected. Yet according to the railway office, the mass of the B Echelon would have to travel to the Balkans. And this is what then happened, even though by 31 July only very few transports had been made. Now, the price was being paid for the fact that the plans for the railway deployment had not been fundamentally changed since 1908, but had instead only been adjusted and updated rather than being completely re-written.390 As the evidence has already long since shown, on 30 July only 31 trains departed in the direction of the Balkans, with 42 trains leaving for the same destination the following day. This amounted to roughly four divisions, in other words, slightly more than one corps. Certainly, it is not to be expected that a regiment that had already been entrained could not be brought back to its peacetime barracks only in order to be entrained once again. This would not only have made no sense in terms of transportation. For reasons of morale and the popular mood at home it was not possible to turn around entire large army units. After all, the troops had been sent off with flags, flowers and brass bands, and with enthusiastic participation by the local population. However, it was equally certain that transports could be halted and redirected. Here, it was not only a question of com- pleting the transports without the diversion via the Balkans and of keeping up appear- ances. The main aim was to be ready for operation earlier against the Russians on the north-eastern front ; it was a matter of at least one week, and, as it would later transpire, of far more than that. However, no-one recommended turning back  – least of all the railway office. And Conrad seemingly bowed to the judgement of Colonel Straub and