Seite - 173 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

Deployment in Echelons and Packets 173 For the soldiers, the transportation was usually also a unique experience. They were sad- dled with vast quantities of food  – an expression of helpless gratuity. ‘In the carriages, it began to stink horribly’, noted Landsturm NCO Johann Hartinger. ‘The Hungarians outdid themselves in bringing provisions. The people were so stuffed full that they vomited out of the carriages’. ‘There was drinking and singing.’410 In most cases, the soldiers did not care how long the journey lasted, despite the fact that hardly anyone particularly enjoyed the days-long railway journey. Understandably, they were curious as to where they were heading, but this information was only given to them after de- training, since it had, after all, become a military secret. If one attempts to follow the events of this railway deployment, one very quickly comes across a series of inconsistencies, and furthermore, above all a considerable ex- ercise in deception enacted by Conrad and the two railway specialists, Colonel Straub and Major Ratzenhofer, after the war. The latter two should be exculpated, at least partially, since their vehement defence of the deployment and transport in echelons and packets, as well as the insistence that the deployment already begun should continue, originated not least from their loyalty to Conrad. He, however, had not in fact over- looked anything. Yet he could very well be accused of bending to the illusion of a rapid victory in the south, of having the desire of the Emperor for the overthrow of Serbia in mind, and of only becoming aware of the reality of the Galician theatre of war when it was already too late. With this, we return once more to the consideration of why the deployments to- wards the Balkans and Russia were so uncoordinated, and why Conrad, at a point in time when he knew that war would also break out against Russia, in fact took no measures to redirect the B Echelon and to accelerate and increase the efficiency of the deployment against Russia. And that was not all : Conrad maintained priority for the Balkans. He used the information from Colonel Straub and Major Ratzenhofer, to the effect that it would no longer be possible to redirect the B Echeclon, to continue with deployment as though Russia would never actually intervene in the war, or if so, then only much later. And yet to call this an illusion would be an understatement. On 29 July, Conrad had already reported to the Emperor in writing that ‘tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow at the latest, it is to be expected that we shall enter the war against the major powers’. On 31 July, the same Conrad, however, reported to his Ger- man counterpart, Moltke : ‘Today, we are still not sure whether Russia is only making threats, which is why we shall not be forced back from our action against Serbia.’411 At the same time, from 28 July onwards, no-one who was halfway informed could doubt any longer that Russia would intervene in the war. In the early morning of 31 July, news of the general mobilisation spread like lightning, and General of Cavalry Baron Viktor von Dankl, who was the designated Commander of the Imperial and Royal 1st Army, noted in Innsbruck : ‘Thank God, this is the great war !’412 This was