Seite - 176 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

176 ‘Thank God, this is the Great War!’ had no desire to work with Generals Frank and Potiorek.417 As a result, Potiorek was made commander of the troops designated to fight against Serbia. Throughout the years, he had been Conrad’s competitor for the post of Chief of the General Staff, and was regarded by Conrad as a ‘genius’. Potiorek was familiar with the future theatre of war. However, he did have several severe handicaps. He was a man to take decisions on his own, and was not a good team player. Even more seriously, although this would only come to be recognised as a real problem during the course of the following weeks, Potiorek wanted to lead a revenge campaign. He was filled with bitter hatred. Until the beginning of August, he had been responsible for conducting the deploy- ment measures in the Balkans, but without knowing whether and how he would be in- volved in the command. Nonetheless, he had already made preparations for starting the offensive against Serbia as soon as possible. The fact that the strategic reserve was also transported southwards could only mean in Potiorek’s eyes that the campaign against Serbia and Montenegro should be conducted with three armies. Furthermore, a com- mand letter on 31 July stated that : ‘The arrangements made by the War Ministry for war scenario B and specifically the deployment remain valid.’418 Potiorek then drafted a plan of operations with the full inclusion of the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army under General of Infantry Böhm-Ermolli, which was to deploy to the Danube and in Syrmia. He passed all of this information on to the Army High Command. Potiorek gave 12 August as the date of the beginning of operations. However, on 6 August, the day on which he was given command of the Balkan forces, the Army High Command informed him that the 2nd Army was to be diverted to the Russian theatre of war.419 While Potiorek now felt a sense of satisfaction at being given the command over ‘his’ theatre of war, he wanted to use all three armies rather than overturning his plan of operations. Indeed, in the short term, he had no other option, since the 5th and 6th Armies, which Potiorek was to have at his disposal at all events, had deployed in the west of Serbia on the Drina and Sava Rivers, and with an imme- diate withdrawal of the 2nd Army, no troops would have been present on the Danube and in Syrmia. However, Potiorek could of course have remained defensive, if he had not received contradictory orders from Vienna, and  – more importantly  – if it had not been for his own ambition. This was to be ‘his’ war, his punitive campaign, and more still : his revenge for Sarajevo. After all, he naturally felt the heavy burden of guilt for his share of the blame in the murder of the heir to the throne and his wife. For him, the war was of a very different nature than for Conrad, for example, who wanted to wage it on the basis of cool calculation and who was cocooned in Social Darwinist thinking. For him, revenge had no part to play. But for Potiorek, things were different. And this is what was so problematic about the Emperor’s decision  – which was driven by the Chief of the Military Chancellery in particular  – to nominate the General of Artillery as Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial and Royal Balkan forces.