Seite - 189 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Initial Campaigns 189 also not on the side of the Army High Command, Conrad’s determination to elimi- nate all sources of resistance grew. And in Archduke Friedrich he found a very willing assistant. Even so, for the time being, this was not sufficient to solve the problems with the Balkan High Command. After a vehement argument with Conrad on 21 August, Potiorek succeeded in per- suading the Chief of the Military Chancellery of the Emperor, Bolfras, to give a letter of command to the Emperor for signature, which specified that from that point on, Potiorek would be able to take command independently. This may have been a gratifi- cation for Potiorek, but was also objectively correct, since under the leadership remits at that time, intervention by the Army High Command and the rapid reaction to de- velopments in the Balkan theatre of war was not possible from Przemyśl. However, it is equally true that from this moment on, consistency in terms of the conduct of the war was lost, at least for a certain period of time. Potiorek’s complaints regarding the Army High Command and, above all, the Chief of the General Staff not only fell on sympathetic ears in the Military Chancellery of the Emperor. He was also fully supported by Berchtold and Tisza, who attempted to ensure that the mass of the troops of the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army could continue to be used in the Balkans, and not only in parts. Tisza had a natural interest in keeping both the Serbs and the Russians away from Hungary, and if necessary, in also having forces available against Romania. However, Berchtold brought the mesh of foreign policy issues into play and instructed his representative in Przemyśl, Baron Giesl, to inform the Army High Command of the following stance on the matter : ‘It is very far from my intention’, Berchtold wrote to Giesl on 20 August, ‘to wish to influence military opera- tions even indirectly. From the perspective of my area of responsibility, I must however point out that, should the operations currently being conducted by the 5th and 6th Ar- mies even merely come to a standstill as a result of the departure of the troops assigned, and were this to become known abroad, then there is reason to believe that this would have a most adverse effect on the conduct of all Balkan states  – including possibly that of Italy  – and that I would be obliged to decline to bear the responsibility for the oc- currence of such a change, which has unforeseeable consequences.’447 Giesl faithfully informed the Chief of the General Staff, who felt, however, that it would be ‘irrespon- sible’ to leave more forces in the Balkans than was absolutely necessary. However, Giesl remained dissatisfied with this response, and also went to Archduke Friedrich. He did so because, as he then telegraphed to Berchtold, he was not sure ‘whether his Highness is being properly informed by the General Staff’. However, Archduke Friedrich was not able to agree to any proposal, and only raised the prospect of either assigning respon- sibility to the Commander of the 5th Army, General Frank, or relieving him of it.448 Conrad was torn one way and the other. He knew that he needed the 2nd Army for the Russian theatre of war. It was to march on to the south flank of the front, to the