Seite - 206 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

206 Adjusting to a Longer War The possibility of overdoing it with the controlling measures was mentioned by the War Minister’s adjutant, Captain Hugo von Lustig : ‘One must only consider that we have one ox to thank for five separate central offices : a leatherskin central office, a meat central office, a bone glue central office, a fats central office and, finally, a commission for supplying the troops with foodstuffs.’ 484 A further effect of these war management measures was the reduction in private consumption. It was intended that raw materials and convenience products, but also foodstuffs, be withdrawn from general consumption and made available for public purposes. Thus, as a result there was no-one who was not made to feel the many shortages.485 Even before the establishment of the various central offices, there had been other controlling measures and interventions. The first of them were in the area of pric- ing policy. Already immediately after the outbreak of war, fears emerged regarding a shortage of foodstuffs. The prices for foodstuffs were often arbitrarily raised ; there were instances of stockpiling. An imperial decree from 1 August 1914 was intended to ensure that the people remained supplied with essential commodities. These included not only foodstuffs, but they were the main cause for concern. There were regulations on the gathering of stocks and sanctions against profiteering. But they failed to make an impact. Foodstuffs became noticeably scarcer in the weeks and months that followed, and likewise noticeably more expensive. This resulted, among other things, in stocks being made to go further and in the fixing of maximum prices. Another eminent prob- lem exacerbated the situation even more : hardly any trains were running in the interior of the country, with which the transport of goods could have been ensured. How little thought had been given to this and how much disruption had been caused by the de- sire for total mobilisation, because of the attempt to be quicker than the enemy and to throw one’s own troops to the front, was evident as early as 25 August 1914 from a letter sent by Berchtold to Conrad in which the Foreign Minister communicated something that had been told to him by the Imperial-Royal Interior Minister, Baron Heinold. Heinold was of the opinion that a serious industrial crisis loomed in the event that the coal and road train transportation was not soon made at least partially possible again. As a result of the shortages, the letter continued, 180,000 unemployed were expected in Vienna before long ; these 180,000 would have to be provided for if the companies were not supplied again with the essentials. Added to this was the problem that the grain had been harvested but could not be brought to the mills. The supply of the major cities was endangered. In Trieste, for example, 5,000 waggons of rice worth 15 million kronen were stored, which made up the annual requirements of the Dual Monarchy.486 But they could not be taken away. The situation was particularly precarious and demanded a solution, since it had ini- tially been assumed for both foreign and domestic policy reasons that the government should not take any action that might lead to unrest among the people due to possible