Seite - 208 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

208 Adjusting to a Longer War ritation from the outset. Whilst the Hungarian Prime Minister Count Tisza was the subject of much approval, including in the post-war historiography, in regard to his political foresight and his skilful leadership of the Hungarian half of the Empire, he was and still is fiercely criticised for his policy in the food sector that hugely favoured Hungary. The tightening of Hungarian export restrictions for agricultural products ul- timately led in Austria to the complete monopolisation of the grain sector by the state. A rigorous survey of the stockpiles had already previously been carried out because it was only possible to calculate the disposable amounts if there was awareness of what was actually available. In Linz, for example, where at the end of 1914 there were 17,000 households, 65 bakeries, 552 general stores and several shops selling flour products, the recording of the grain and flour stocks had to be carried out within three days. 400 commissions of two people each (teachers, municipal councillors, club members, etc.) were tasked with carrying out the assessment. The conclusion was that a larger city such as Linz could cover only around 50 per cent of its requirements up to the next harvest and that the calculations were made even worse since the additional requirements of military hospitals, infirmaries, prisoner of war camps and above all the demands of the treasury had to be met.493 The result was a renewed reduction in the per-head quotas for flour and bread. The introduction of ration cards for bread and flour was now only a small step away. Practically all of those in positions of responsibility were now in agreement that ac- tion had to be taken quickly. The businessmen, the state administration and especially the military authorities wanted this in order to avoid food riots or wage strikes. At the end of September 1914, therefore, deliberations were initiated by the Ministries of the Interior, Trade and Agriculture of both halves of the Empire in order to create a legal foundation for state intervention in the economic sector. This was necessary above all in Austria. Thus, an imperial decree was prepared, since a law could not be passed without convening a legislative body. Issues requiring regulation were the domestic problems, cross-border trade and economic reprisals against the enemy abroad. The Imperial-Royal Ministry of the Interior wanted to see measures on the obligation to work included in the decree, but this item was ultimately dropped. On 10 October the Emperor signed the enabling decree.494 It remained in force until 1917, before it was then superseded by the war economy enabling law. The enabling decree was thus issued at a point in time when there was admittedly imminent danger but no crisis had yet broken out. What would happen, however, if the supply with essential items seriously suffered and real privation broke out ? And there was another question : would it be pos- sible to maintain the radical measures of the war administration and the militarisation of the home front over an extended period of time ? What effects could be expected for the economy and the social fabric if the war should last longer and if the needs of the public had to be restricted further ?