Seite - 255 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Fortress on the San 255 sideration, but it makes no reference to the fact that for Conrad, this matter was only of lesser importance. It makes even less sense to ascribe only personal motives to him, and to present him as a power-hungry general. It is most likely that Conrad’s rejection of the proposal for a joint high command was his desire to make a last ditch attempt to defend himself against German dominance. After all, what use was it to fight with all one’s strength to preserve the Monarchy, only to then capitulate to the German Em- pire ? Here, Kerchnawe’s book, Unser letzter Kampf (‘Our Last Battle’), again comes to mind, which Conrad had doubtless read, and which was almost prophetic in describing such a turn of events. Since it can be assumed, however, that Kerchnawe was merely portraying the mood of the times, this struggle against German dominance and the fight for self-assertion was inherent in Austria-Hungary’s last war right from the very beginning. On 6 November, the matter was laid to rest for the time being when the Emperor expressed his ‘Supreme Trust’ in Archduke Friedrich and General Conrad in a telegram, and set the prospect of the creation of a joint high command to one side. This marked the end of the first leadership crisis, which had been provoked by the complicated relationship between Germany and Austria. On 14 November, the heir to the throne telegraphed the Emperor : ‘Harmony with the Germans and in the High Command complete’.612 The creation of a joint high command was not discussed again until the summer of 1916. However, the difficult situation in the north-eastern theatre of war and the no less complicated relationship to the high-ranking German military leaders had left deep scars in the Army High Command. A report presented to the Emperor and compiled for the Foreign Ministry at the beginning of November reflects this clearly.613 Conrad, around whom almost everything turned, politically as well as militarily, with regard to dualistic and alliance issues, was subject to extreme psychological stress towards the end of the year. His oldest son had been killed in battle, and the war situation was threat- ening. In his view, the forces that the Monarchy was able to provide would only suffice to fill the gaps, but not to significantly improve the relative strength in relation to the Russians… Were the Russian masses to make a charge, they would overrun everything. ‘Whether the target will be Vienna or Berlin is impossible to say ; perhaps Russia will under favourable conditions be in a position to pursue both […]’ The dispatch of Ger- man reinforcements was therefore vital, ‘an issue of life or death for Germany and Austria-Hungary in equal measure’. Even if the Germans were to conquer Verdun in just a few days, he claimed, a decision in the west would still be far from being made. By contrast, it would be possible to defeat Russia with an additional 400,000 men in the east. Only a victory over Russia would influence events in the south-east. ‘What use to us is the very slow development of the Russo-Turkish war, as we anticipate it ; what use is a gradually developing Mohammedan movement in India ; what benefit is there from