Seite - 294 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

294 The First Winter of the War a desire to make peace will be regarded by its opponents as defeated and their demands will increase accordingly.’ Forgách, however, saw the only chance of getting off more or less lightly in the conclusion of an immediate peace. Italy should be invited to function as mediator, the same Italy to which Trentino (Trento) would have to be ceded. Towards Serbia, a status quo would be striven for, likewise in the case of Russia. Following the capitulation of Przemyśl, East Galicia would perhaps also have to be relinquished. For the purpose of initiating talks, an immediate understanding with the German Empire would be necessary, in order ‘to convince the leading German elements that the peace settlement is absolutely necessary for both of us and its postponement involves far more dangers than benefits’. Germany’s position in the war was also no longer bright, according to Forgách. ‘With the high-strung expectations in Germany  – not within the now already quite anxious government but instead among the population  – it will, however, be diffi- cult to conclude a peace that corresponds so little to the sacrifices that have been made. For our part, firm words will be necessary with regard to the catastrophic consequences of possible further resistance. In the event of German reproaches, we will not be able to suppress the fact that the unfortunate outcome is both politically and military Ger- many’s fault alone.’ This was a rather bold formulation and can only be understood in the sense that Forgách wanted to lay the entire responsibility for the unleashing of the World War at the door of the German Empire. Austria had only wanted to wage war against Serbia. Germany, however, had sought to pull Great Britain into the war. The entry of Great Britain, in turn, had resulted in Italy’s neutrality, etc. Finally, Forgách noted : ‘The absence of military successes is once more Germany’s fault alone. Militarily, the Monarchy has only performed poorly so far in one respect, in Serbia. But even here it was only the most energetic pressure from Germany that forced us, in complete polit- ical and military misapprehension of the importance of the Balkan theatre of war, to throw everything to the north against our better judgement. […] Thus, German advice is also partially to thank for the shameful Serbian fiasco. […] The greatest military failure in this global struggle is, of course, Germany’s war in France. It was generally expected that France would be wrestled down in 2 or 3 months by its superior neigh- bour. In fact, the Germans have actually only overrun Belgium and, with the help of our mortar batteries, blown up the Belgian and northern French fortresses, which were taken by surprise and not yet completed.’ This, argued Forgách, simply had to be said, in order ‘to justify the claim that Germany must also be content to end the war with a lenient peace and undefeated. […] If a peace were concluded now, the balance of power  – we have not been a world power so far  – could still be maintained. Eco- nomic recovery would also occur after a few years. The continuation of the war with a minimal probability of military successes could, by contrast, have catastrophic results.