Seite - 341 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

Of Heroes and Cowards 341 fears appeared to be unfounded. The Bosniaks in part appeared to be fanatical warriors and made no compromises, particularly in relation to the Serbs. The Bosnian-Herze- govinian Infantry Regiments No. 2 and 3 first took part in the campaign against Serbia, as did parts of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Infantry Regiment No. 1. However, then all four Bosnian-Herzegovinian infantry regiments and the only Bosnian-Herzegovinian ‘Feldjäger’ light infantry battalion were deployed in Galicia. On this occasion, a battal- ion was again formed from the troops of the 3rd Regiment, who had originally been left behind in Budapest due to their unreliability, and this battalion was subsequently involved in all the successes and failures of the first year of the war.800 Here, the Bos- niaks gained a reputation for being particularly courageous. However, it was the Hungarians and the Germans who vied for a place at the top of the loyalty pyramid and the reputation of particular bravery. The Hungarians regarded themselves as underpinning the state and for years emphasised the fact that within the half of the Empire in which they dominated, order was maintained not only through force and the suspension of common rights that had been won with considerable effort, as they occasionally reproached the ‘kingdoms and lands represented in the Imperial Assembly’ for doing. However, they were also the least reluctant to express their na- tionalism through action and already attracted attention by failing to take heed of the national sensibilities of the smaller nationalities. Complaints about the behaviour of Hungarian troops did not therefore relate to their willingness to fight, but to attacks on their own population, particularly in cases when doubts were expressed as to their loyalty to the Dual Monarchy. The Hungarians were represented in fouteen infantry regiments of the Common Army, with a share of over seventy per cent (Imperial and Royal Infantry Regiments No. 19, 32, 34, 38, 39, 44, 46, 48, 60, 65, 68, 69, 86 and 101), as well as in the ‘Feldjäger’ Light Infantry Battalion No. 24. They more or less formed the entire Honvéd Infantry Regiments No. 1, 35, 6, 9, 10,17, 20, 29, 30 and 31, constituted the majority of the troops in the 16th Imperial and Royal Hussar Regiments, and were also represented in numerous other troops bodies and in all branches of the military in accordance with their national structure of around 23 per cent of the population. However, the share of Hungarian officers in the Common Army was very low, at just over 9 per cent. The reason for this was simple : Hungarian officers preferred to serve in the Honvéd than in the Common Army. This gave them a type of coherence which it was hoped could perhaps one day be used to the advantage of Hungary. The Hungarians, in contrast to the Czechs, proved to be immune to Russian prop- aganda. Towards the end of the year in 1914, leaflets appeared claiming that the Rus- sians were advancing towards Budapest, Vienna and Kraków. In the case of Hungary, the error of 1849 was to be made good, since the Russians now were coming not to cut Hungary down but as liberators : ‘Long live the free, independent Hungary !’ The