Seite - 358 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

358 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me (Triest) and Dalmatia, and using the word ‘Croat’ as a swearword.828 It was well-known that Archduke Franz Ferdinand was hostile to Italy. Conrad von Hötzendorf’s aversion to the Apennine state could be heard on numerous occasions and read in position pa- pers. This did not change the fact that Conrad valued his Italian counterpart, General Pollio, and cultivated a relationship with him that was not only correct but in fact af- fectionate. Nevertheless, Conrad did not trust the government and the opinion-makers in the Kingdom of Italy an inch and saw himself confirmed in his principal rejection by numerous small incidents and above all a case of espionage. All in all, the two sides found plenty of reasons to find fault with each other. It only became more emotional now and then, as in August 1913, when the Governor of Trieste, Prince Konrad Ho- henlohe-Schillingfürst, broke with a long-time practice and dismissed all so-called im- perial Italians from the city’s civil service. This affected only 40 of the 30,000 Italians residing in Trieste, but Italian politics and media were in uproar.829 For months on end, relations were very strained, which was all the more odd because the military heads of the two monarchies agreed at the same time on joint action in the event of war and swore absolute allegiance. Political alienation was confronted with military agreement. On 28 June 1914, General Pollio died quite suddenly. The man who had seen more in the relationship to the Imperial and Royal Army than ‘allied enemies’ was dead. What might have happened, had he lived longer ? Were the reflections of his successor, Count Luigi Cadorna, to be taken seriously ? As late as 1918 he had said : ‘Oh well, if we had marched to war at Germany’s side in August 1914, then it would have been very advantageous for us. We would have taken Nice, likewise Corsica and Tunisia. […] We would have marched  – and how ! I would have made sure of that myself.’830 Alexander Demandt’s book Ungeschehene Geschichte : Ein Traktat über die Frage : Was wäre geschehen, wenn … ? (Undone History : A Treatise on the Question, What would have happened if … ?) could be expanded with a noteworthy chapter. But let us restrict ourselves to the actual course of events.831 Italy had of course suspected, or rather : Italy had known that Austria-Hungary would call Serbia to account for the assassination in Sarajevo and as a precaution had already lodged the point that it wanted compensation for any changes in the Balkans in favour of the Habsburg Monarchy. On 23 July 1914, Italy was informed that Aus- tria-Hungary had sent a limited démarche to Serbia ; 24 hours later the text of the démarche was handed over in Rome. This instance of being informed after the fact makes it clear that the Habsburg Monarchy had no interest, as was the case throughout the July Crisis, in involving Italy in the decision-making of the Danube Monarchy or that of the German Empire. The explanation given by the Ballhausplatz (Austro-Hun- garian Imperial Chancellery) to the effect that the Imperial and Royal ambassador at the Quirinal Palace, Katejan von Mérey, had been taken ill at the most inopportune moment, which was why the mishap with the late handover had happened,832 was