Seite - 369 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

‘Sacro egoismo’ 369 been concocted in the Military Chancellery of the Emperor. The Adjutant General of the Emperor, Count Paar, should be sent ahead in order to make the matter palatable to the Emperor, though it was not entirely clear how the matter should be approached and the idea was dropped for the time being.866 At the end of January the idea was aired for the first time in the German Empire of indemnifying Austria-Hungary for the cession of Trentino to Italy with the coal mining district around Sosnowice in Russian Poland.867 It was questionable whether Austria would even regard such as offer as sufficiently attractive. On 3 February, the first session of the Joint Council of Ministers led by Burián addressed the matter of Italy. Afterwards, the minister resumed talks with the Italian ambassador, the Duke of Avarna, and stunned the latter with a list of counter-demands, also with reference to Article VII of the Triple Alliance treaty. Burián said that Austria had the right to claim compensation for the temporary occupation of the Dodecanese and Vlorë by Italy. This was a turnaround that Rome had certainly not expected. Italy then broke off talks with Vienna and began for the first time to make threats.868 Although this abortion was not the end of talks, it had nonetheless become clear than a turning point had been reached. The Austrian ambassador in Rome, now Baron Karl von Macchio, was able to learn that Italy’s military preparations would not be completed until April 1915.869 At that point, however, an entry into the war should be expected. The German Empire now increased the pressure on Austria-Hungary. Prince Bülow, the German ambassador in Rome, who, without any inhibitions at all, advocated con- cessions, expressed his opinion in a private letter to the editor-in-chief of the Ham- burger Fremdenblatt, von Eckhard, to the effect that more influence had to be exerted on Vienna, since ‘it would be outrageous if Austria, after it pulled us into this war, by virtue of its incompetence at the beginning of this war and in the last two or three years, would rob us of the involvement of Italy and Romania [and] send another two million enemies after us’.870 The Chief of the Military Chancellery of the Emperor, Baron Moritz von Lyncker, expressed himself with perhaps even more clarity : ‘The Austrians do not want to, they are so haughty and blinkered, particularly the old emperor and the so-called high nobility. How they imagine the war with Italy is anyone’s guess ; one might think they would rather go under “with honour” and take us with them into the abyss. That’s a nice prospect !’871 Falkenhayn regarded the Danube Monarchy as a ‘cadaver’, and the leader of the German National Liberals characterised the alliance partner, to whom Germany had sworn blind loyalty, as a ‘corpse galvanised for heroic feats of strength’.872 This was also one way of looking at it. The fact was that ever more perplexity and helplessness began to spread. From January onwards it could repeatedly be heard that Italy would declare war in April. One person recommended concessions and added in the same breath that it was doubtful whether Italy would allow concessions to prevent it from entering the war.