Seite - 372 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

372 ‘The King of Italy has declared war on Me of Dalmatia. The British Foreign Secretary Grey suggested that Italy should at least forego Spalato. On 27 March, Sonnino declared himself ready to do so. Difficulties also emerged with the distribution of the islands off the coast of Dalmatia, which had to be negotiated with Serbia, but these were ultimately not very eminent problems, since Serbia was naturally extremely interested in an additional opponent for Austria-Hun- gary. On 14 April, agreement was reached over the wording of the article concerning the Dalmatian islands, but new difficulties emerged due to Montenegro’s rights on the Adriatic. Finally, only one point was open, namely the date of the Italian entry into the war. The Entente powers requested 15 April. The Italian government could not accept this date, however, because military preparations could not be completed by then. Now it was really only a question of a date, however, and nothing more. Whilst all this was being brought under lock and key, Italy continued to negotiate with Vienna and left Austria-Hungary and Germany in the belief that an amicable solution was possible that conformed to the Triple Alliance. On 16 March, Prime Min- ister Salandra wrote to Foreign Minister Sonnino that Vienna should ‘be allowed to believe that we regard a friendly solution as possible, and all the more so, the less we believe in it. This stance, however much power of disguise it might cost you, seems to me to be currently essential in the interests of our country.’880 In the meantime, Vienna was in the process of completely revising its attitude to It- aly. It was said in advance that the session of the Joint Council of Ministers on 8 March, which would be a Privy Council due to the presence of the Emperor, and at which the heir to the throne would also be present, would be the scene of ‘meaningful discussions’ on the further fate of the Monarchy. Burián, Tisza, Stürgkh and Ernest von Koerber, Biliński’s successor as Joint Finance Minister, as well as War Minister Krobatin were convinced of the necessity of cessions. Conrad, who had been fetched to Vienna from Cieszyn, in order to attend the session, began by reminiscing and stressed that he had been in favour of a pre-emptive war against Italy for good reasons. This remark had to come, because Conrad saw in the dilemma, in which the Dual Monarchy found itself as a result of the Italian attempt to blackmail it, nothing other than confirmation of what he had predicted since his appointment as Chief of the General Staff. Therefore, he frequently expressed himself with barely surpassable contempt about Aehrenthal, who  – as Conrad claimed  – had prevented a timely defeat of Italy. The cession of Trentino would be a severe loss from a strategic point of view. But it would have to be accepted. Emperor Franz Joseph  – and this was decisive  – had been made increasingly pre- pared to grant concessions. He called the Italians ‘bootlegging lowlifes’ and ‘bandits’, but on 27 February, the Lord Chamberlain Prince Montenuovo delightedly ascer- tained that the Emperor was no longer strictly hostile. In fact, he let it be known on 8 March that he was prepared to grant concessions in the case of Trentino, but not in the case of Trieste and the Isonzo.