Seite - 393 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

On the Isonzo and in the Sette Comuni 393 service of the Army High Command, traced the knowledge of the Austrians about the Italians, which soon increased significantly, least of all to the more complex or quali- tatively better network of agents for the Danube Monarchy, but rather to the fact that the Chief of the Italian General Staff, Cadorna, had absolutely no regard for espionage. It appeared that he trusted in the numerical superiority of the Italians, as well as the better quality of their fortifications. From August 1914, the Italian fortifications were reinforced and positions were established further forward, since there was a reluctance to rely solely on the long-dis- tance fighting power of the artillery. Unlike Austria-Hungary, Italy was therefore by no means so reticent in reinforcing its land fortifications. In order to strengthen its artillery, guns were brought to the Italian border from abandoned fortresses and from the armouries. The Italians also armed their fortresses with modern guns and larger calibres. Finally, they had 844 guns ready for firing in and around their barrier forts alone. The border defence troops from all branches of the military numbered 142,000 men, and under the protection of this considerable contingent, the Italian Army was mobilised.930 The mobile militia had been in place since January 1915, and at the end of April, brigade and divisional cadres had been formed. Beyond the organisational and arma- ment measures, shortly after taking office, Cadorna had also ordered the exceptional measure that like no other was designed to help ensure that the Italian soldiers were ready for war ; the Chief of the General Staff had set in motion a departure from the fundamental secular attitude among politicians and the military and ordered that pas- toral care for the military be established. This was intended to convince the soldiers in the mass army, who came predominantly from the rural regions of Italy, that the war aims were God’s will, without simply ordering them to be courageous. In the words of Mario Isnenghi, the military chaplains ‘were the only intellectuals who were tolerated by the military leadership in the proximity of the uniformed soldiers. They taught the minimal patriotism that consisted of acquiescence and obedience’.931 This was a further step towards making Italy ready for war. Whether this would be sufficient to go on the offensive against Austria-Hungary would remain to be seen. Certainly, military interests favoured a delay in the start of the shooting war in order to be able to further intensify the training of recruits. The lack of coal and ore was a further reason why Italy was not able to come forward even earlier and even more strongly. Chief of the Gen- eral Staff Cadorna had,therefore, set the long-term date for the start of operations as May 1915. In mid-April, transportation to the deployment zones began. Finally, on 23 April, a few days before the Treaty of London was signed, the mobilisation of the first eight army corps began, followed by a further six corps by May. As a result, the official declaration of the start of the war was merely a formality under international law, and had no further meaning.932