Seite - 403 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

On the Isonzo and in the Sette Comuni 403 On the Isonzo front, the Italians were far more inclined towards attack than in Tyrol. This also corresponded to the operative plans of Cadorna, who not only concentrated his main force in this section, but also had goals in mind that were so to speak within reach. Already on the morning of 24 May, the 2nd and 3rd Italian Army crossed the border of the Empire, occupied Kobarid (Karfreit) and reached the Isonzo. On 25 May, the vanguards of both armies stood on either side of the bridgehead at Gorizia that had been created by the Imperial and Royal 5th Army, and for a short period of time, a critical situation even arose when the withdrawal of the Imperial and Royal troops and in particular the artillery from Gorizia was ordered. Since the command of the 5th Army had got no further than establishing its base in Maribor, there was a lack of direct, tight leadership. Boroević wanted to give up the town and withdraw his army to behind the Isonzo. However, he then received instructions from the com- mand of the south-western front to occupy the heights to the west of the river with the central and northern wing of his army. The problem here was that due to the political considerations until the start of May and beyond, no fortifications had been constructed, and precisely in the Gorizia area and to the north, the troops could only build cover by piling up layers of stones.954 The artillery advisor to the command on the south-western front, Lieutenant Colonel Richard von Körner, amassed the heavy artillery in the Gorizia area, however, and from 28 May, Gorizia was also ready to be defended.955 Archduke Eugen and General Krauß at first only involved themselves in the preparations for the defensive action from Maribor, but were again severely criticised for the measures taken, with Boroević becoming directly abusive. The high- est Austrian commands appeared, however, to be incredibly similar in their aversion to gathering first-hand impressions from the front, remaining far to the rear, and frequently without primary information. Conrad himself led the war against Italy from Cieszyn. The problem was also, however, that the subordinate commands were very quick to criticise the high commands for being remote from the troops, while at the same time condemning inspections and more extensive visits to the front as inappropriate interference. Following battles in which high losses were incurred around the crossing points on the Isonzo, and following the loss of Monfalcone, on 9 June, the Italian 3rd Army halted its attack on the edge of the Karst Plateau. After a brief period of rest, Cadorna planned to concentrate his forces even more strongly, to bring in even more artillery and to alter the method of attack. The Chief of the Italian General Staff also made it unambiguously clear that he would be ruthless in applying harsh measures whenever, in his view, officers and above all generals had shown themselves to be hesitant or had not ruthlessly ordered their troops to fight. Cadorna was not obliged to consult anyone when it came to dismissing a general, and had no qualms about having high-ranking officers tried before a military court.956