Seite - 410 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

410 The Third Front metres, the Königsspitze at 3,859 metres, the Monte Cevedale at 3,778 metres, the Marmolata, the Tofana, and so on  – names that until then were only familiar to the local population and mountaineers, became known to the wider world. While a breakthrough in the mountains was not impossible, it did require time-con- suming and immensely elaborate preparations, which went far beyond those required for an offensive on flat terrain. When they took into account the troop distribution and the conditions on the Italian side, the Austrians could therefore soon conclude to their satisfaction that during the course of 1915, no decisive attack by the Italians could any longer be anticipated on the Tyrolean front. The Army High Command and the Com- mand of the South-Western Front therefore focussed their attention on improving the defences on the Isonzo, including the bridgehead at Gorizia. This presented the troops with additional challenges, since they were not simply granted a rest from battle, but had to use the respite to reinforce the fortifications in such a way that there would not be a repeat of the terrible losses inflicted during the Second Battle of the Isonzo.978 The Commander of the Imperial and Royal 5th Army, General Boroević, ultimately had every reason to be satisfied. However, even he had to battle against impressions that were difficult to bear even after a whole year of war. In a private letter to the Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza, he explained on 10 August 1915 : ‘If the enemy continues as it has until now, it will lose all its offensive force in just a few weeks’, and would no longer be capable of launching an attack. ‘It really is incomprehensible that after a year of war in Europe, it [the enemy] does not manoeuvre differently. I am faced with a conun- drum ! During the 2nd Battle of Gorizia, I was faced with around half a million men, of whom one half stood and watched how the other was decimated. […] My losses are a sensitive issue ; in the two battles, I lost 40,000 men, dead, wounded and taken prisoner (in most cases wounded). […] The infernal enemy artillery additionally benefits from the splintering of the shattered rock. A further problem is that the bodies cannot be buried. They contaminate the air, body parts fly around in the fire, as a result of which our people become nauseous and lose their appetite, and lose strength despite ample supplies of food. […] In the beginning, the superior enemy mass artillery fire demoral- ised the troops. It was pure Hell. Now, that is also overcome.’979 Already at the beginning of September 1915, three weeks after the Second Battle of the Isonzo was brought to an end, Marshal Joffre, the French Generalissimo, ap- peared at the Comando Supremo in Udine in order to persuade Cadorna to take up the offensive again and, in so doing, to indirectly support the allied autumn offensive. At first, Cadorna showed little optimism, but was then given so much time and means for preparing the Third Battle of the Isonzo that he was able to muster an even greater concentration of troops and materials than before. On 18 October 1915, two-thirds of the Italian Army were mobilised in order to enforce the breakthrough. The main target of the attack was the town of Gorizia. The battle reached its zenith between 1 and 4