Seite - 453 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The ‘Black-Yellow’ Offensive 453 time again, destroyed bridges and roads and finally also had the rain on their side, so that the Imperial and Royal troops once again became bogged down. General Ivanov, the Commander of the Russian south-western front, for his part ordered relief attacks from the bridgehead around Ternopil (Tarnopol), thus threatening the Imperial and Royal 2nd Army and the German South Army (under Bothmer), which remained within the remit of the Army High Command. Conrad needed a success to the north, in Volhynia, if only in order to relieve the pressure from his own fronts. 14 divisions were deployed at the focal point of the fighting in Volhynia, and it simply did not make sense that they were unable to penetrate six Russian divisions. The encirclement in the north that Conrad had envisaged was inadequate. The Russians succeeded in extracting themselves from the envelopment. Finally, they again made themselves ready for battle in the Olyka area. Among the staffs at Cieszyn, the atmosphere was seething. The Chief of the Italian Group, Major Karl Schneller, who was already following the operations in the east with particular interest since they would decide whether or not there would soon be an opportunity to relocate forces to the south-west, noted on 3 September : ‘This en- tire operation is one of the most shameful that we have commanded. An army allows itself to be held up by two brigades and bumbles about for so long until an enemy that really is stronger arrives.’1080 Finally, it was ordered in the harshest terms that the Austro-Hungarian troops be hauled forwards ; in particular the commanders should be forced to lead more effectively. On 4 September, Archduke Friedrich decreed that the army commanders were to establish commands according to which no further orders to retreat were permitted. What emerged here was a dilemma for the Austro-Hungarian leadership, however, and threw a conceivably crooked light on their operational abili- ties. The army commanders and a whole series of corps commanders were indeed not capable of successfully preparing and implementing a larger offensive operation. They displayed a degree of amateurishness that due to a sense of shame was in most cases omitted in the Austrian literature following the war. It is almost unfair, however, to single out individual persons for criticism. Certainly, it was not only individuals. Starting with the Army High Command and continuing through the army commands and corps commands down to the divisional commanders, it could be seen time and again that the generals were frequently not up to the task, de- veloped too little initiative, in some cases failed to obey commands and, above all, could be neither convinced nor inspired. Here also, it was not simply a question of failure ; to a certain degree, the malaise lay deeper. During peacetime, officer training was clearly inadequate and in part inappropriate. During the war, it became even shorter and of necessity of poorer quality. The lack of theoretical and practical elements was to be compensated for by combat experience. It also had to be taken into account that in a situation in which army components and armies had now regained their independence,