Seite - 455 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The ‘Black-Yellow’ Offensive 455 east. As if that were not enough, the Chief of the Russia Group in the Army High Command, Lieutenant Colonel Christophori, even proposed that reinforcements be sent from the south-western front.1081 This naturally met with the strongest resistance from the Italian advisor, Major Schneller, and was also not put into practice. However, it was precisely here that the crisis was manifest. The battle had already passed its point of culmination, and it had been noticeable that the Russians had not only re-grouped, but would for their part go on to the offensive for the first time since the Gorlice– Tarnów Offensive. General Ivanov set his main force against what was in itself the strongest section of the Imperial and Royal north-eastern front, Army Group Archduke Joseph Ferdinand (1st and 4th Army). From the Rokitno Marshes, which had been regarded as unsuitable for larger-scale operations, Ivanov directed reinforcements towards the area of his 8th Army and, in so doing, enabled Brusilov to compensate for his inferiority of numbers. Finally, the Russians broke through the Austro-Hungarian positions at the Stubiel stream to the north-east of Dubno.1082 The Russian attack affected the Imperial and Royal 4th Army most of all, and it was no coincidence that the mood there was compared with the situation and mood among the Balkan forces in December 1914. The Commander of the X Corps, for example, Major General Martiny, noted in his diary : ‘We are all dispirited. Why ? What is the reason ? The reason is the reckless, unfounded energy that is constantly demanded of us from the Army High Command, until events, the pressure from the superior enemy and the exhaustion of the troops create a catastrophe. You only have to look at Potiorek !’ In the Army High Command, meanwhile, Schneller noted in his diary for 15 Septem- ber : ‘The 4th Army is operating outrageously poorly.’1083 In the Army High Command, there was astonishment at the low level of fighting spirit and poor leadership of the troops. Conrad’s aide-de-camp, Kundmann, recorded : ‘Chief says : it is impossible to plan an operation with our troops. Throughout the entire war, we have had nothing so simple as this operation, nor as certain, and even that has been messed up.’1084 The Chief of the Italian Group, Schneller, reported on Conrad’s psychological state : ‘Conrad creates the impression that he is deeply affected by events. He is in fact a poor man. I see today how he is given orientation. He and all the ‘gung-hos’ standing over a map : Brantner, Captain in the General Staff, reads the report from the 4th Army from a Hughes [telegraph] strip that had not even been gummed ! And from this, the Chief of the General Staff is supposed to form an impression.’1085 Conrad could have obtained an impression for himself at the front, but it was one of his idiosyncrasies that he almost never became acquainted with the situation directly. He was against visiting the fronts in general. Conrad and Falkenhayn discussed the effects of the Russian counterattack, and al- though Falkenhayn in particular suggested that it would be advantageous to draw back