Seite - 459 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The ‘Black-Yellow’ Offensive 459 could draw a quintessential value from what had happened : for the Austro-Hungarian soldiers who had believed they could conquer Russia, the ‘black-yellow’ offensive had been an unequivocal lesson.1094 The reasons for this disaster are not difficult to find. It was not only the poorly conceived operation in itself that was the problem, since the planning was thoroughly logical, and the disposition of the troops was probably in order. However, it was in particular those serious diseases from which the Imperial and Royal Army had already been suffering for a long time that emerged. The talents and skills of the officers were frequently inadequate in order to implement the operational ideas. The troops, who had already lost confidence or had even already become disaffected, would not submit to being led. The weather was also a factor, since at the start of September, the weather conditions had changed and, from that day on, rain fell almost continuously. In this region, which was not arid terrain, this caused the rivers to swell, severely hampering the movement of artillery and supply convoys. The failure was least of all a result of insufficient troop numbers, insufficient weapons or lack of ammunition, since all this was just about satisfactory. However, it should also be taken into account that some of the troops were overstrained. If one takes the 3rd Infantry Division as an example, it had marched almost 900 kilometres between 4 May and the end of September, and the advance had involved fighting. The cavalry, which had regained its strength, was unable to assert itself against the Russian riders. In the Polesian terrain, the Russians proved themselves to be far more at home than the Imperial and Royal Cavalry, which in some cases was also equipped with poor maps.1095 Thus, one individual, and one command post of the Imperial and Royal Army, felt robbed of success by another. Among the front commanders the loss of confidence in Conrad as a military leader and in the Army High Command overall must have had a severely detrimental effect. Major General Martiny probably expressed this particularly concisely in his diary when he noted : ‘Army High Command beats down all a(rmy) commands, who are not allowed to have their own opinion, nor to have the courage to express their views openly. The few general staffs there are a disaster for the armies. Ever more reckless offensives without moderation or sense. Shooting and exposure of the leaders who are unwilling to fall in line with this, and now the consequences are being felt. This behaviour of the Army High Command (whether Conrad knows an- ything of this is doubtful) is a blight and an unlucky star for the entire conduct of war and has already brought about many regretful consequences. It is now high time for a thorough clear-out there !’1096 There was clearly also someone who then informed the Deputy Chief of the Military Chancellery of the Emperor on the internal activities of the Army High Command and personal estimations, the aide-de-camp of Archduke Friedrich, Baron Mor-Merkl. However, he was not rewarded with much gratitude. On 24 October, it was already