Seite - 462 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

462 Factory War and Domestic Front, 1915 comment was : ‘This is a political issue. With this operation, Austria-Hungary abdi- cates as a major power ; the leadership falls into the hands of Germany. If a German military commander is the leader there [here, he refers to Serbia], we will have abdi- cated there.’1102 Conrad was also of the opinion at the beginning of September that it would be best to come to an arrangement with Serbia.1103 Nonetheless, events had in fact already progressed beyond these objections and spec- ulations. It had however also become irrelevant what options Serbia for its part had been considering, and what the Italians in particular wished to force it to do. Italy had greatly hoped that Serbia would again go on the offensive, since this would have fur- ther splintered the Imperial and Royal armies and  – as was the hope in Rome  – would have made the heart of the Habsburg Monarchy an easy target for an Italian advance. However, the Serbs were on the one hand highly relieved to be able to continue their recovery from the fighting, epidemics and hardships, while on the other, they distrusted Italian politics. While Belgrade had not been involved in the London negotiations, it had reached its own conclusions regarding the fact that the Allies had signed a treaty with the Italians. This could only mean that Dalmatia had been promised to the Ital- ians. Combined with an Albania dominated by Italy, this could only have a detrimental effect on Serbia’s push towards the Adriatic. Serbia’s troops were therefore ordered to march towards Albania as a precautionary measure, and occupied Elbasan and Tirana. These were intended at some point to serve as a lever for negotiations regarding a reor- ganisation of the ownership of the territory in the western Balkans. As if this were not enough, Serbia also felt it necessary to provide military backup in order to pursue a further option. There was not only a push to reach the sea, but claims were also made in the direction of Bulgaria, for the fulfilment of which the ‘drôle de guerre’ on the Danube and the Sava appeared to create the best possible conditions. In July and August 1915, division after division was sent to the Bulgarian border, as Phil- lips, the British military attaché in Serbia, noted with concern.1104 Then Belgrade had looked to Bucharest. If the Romanians had entered the war against the Central Powers in the spring or the summer, as Italy had done, Serbia might also have joined them.1105 However, Romania had remained neutral. As a result, Serbia also waited. And here, the law of action lay with the Central Powers or, more specifi- cally : with the Germans. At the beginning of August, a Bulgarian mediator arrived at the German Grand Headquarters in Pszczyna. His mission was to conclude the still outstanding political and military agreements, and above all to negotiate the price for Bulgaria’s entry into the war. Like Romania, Bulgaria had been faltering since July 1914, and it was threatened. Here, ancient political modes of action were combined with undisguised opportunism. One principle was : the enemy of my enemy is my friend. The second dominant question was : who is offering more and, above all, who will win ? Whoever offered more, and