Seite - 464 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

464 Factory War and Domestic Front, 1915 initiated by the Germans, and that it would mainly be conducted with German and Bulgarian troops. Furthermore, he claimed that there was a clause in the agreement with Bulgaria that stipulated that the command should be held by a German general. This was no doubt correct, but it did not yet mean that the supreme commander against Serbia would have to be subordinate to the German Supreme Army Command. Con- rad insisted on an Austro-Bulgarian high command, since around half of the armies (he did not calculate the number of divisions, since then, the Austrian minority would have become clear) would have to be provided by the Danube Monarchy. Austria-Hungary would also be responsible, and primarily so, for logistics and transport areas. A Balkan war under the supreme command of a Prussian general would, according to Conrad, ‘severely damage the position of the Monarchy in the Balkans, remain incomprehen- sible and run counter to the sentiment among the people in the Balkan states, and equally also the peoples of the Monarchy’. As a riposte to Falkenhayn’s reference to the fact that Germany had important interests in the Balkans, Conrad hurled back a phrase by Bismarck, saying that until now, the Balkans had meant even less to Germany than the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.1110 However, Conrad himself had hardly any means left to bring about a change of course, since the Monarchy had already abdicated as a major power, and had been po- litically, militarily and above all also economically taken in tow by Germany. The Ger- man Empire decided on the structure of the alliance, and decided whether a strategic offensive should or should not be initiated in a theatre of war. The German Supreme Army Command had the troops and decided on how to lead them, while the Imperial and Royal Army Command was left with only individual sections of the front. How- ever, Austria-Hungary had no choice other than to ultimately agree to the German plans, and, to make matters worse, it was weakened following the defeats in Russia. However, in some ways, the Imperial and Royal armies contributed to forfeiting the esteem in which they were held by others. The setbacks in East Galicia, for which they only had themselves to blame, were just one factor. Equally, however, old, well-known machinations set in when it came to arranging the supreme command over the Impe- rial and Royal troops in the forthcoming campaign. The commander nominated for the force, which was now known as the 3rd Army, was General of Cavalry Carl von Tesztyánsky. However, he had not only made himself unpopular with the Hungarian military authorities, but also with Tisza, causing Tisza to accuse him to the Emperor and in a letter to Archduke Friedrich of being ‘agitated and nervous’.1111 Conrad thun- dered that it could not be permitted that an army commander could be dismissed by a prime minister. Since the Emperor wished to please Tisza, however, and wished to see General of Artillery Baron Hermann Kövess von Kövessháza nominated, who was a general far more acceptable to Tisza, the Army High Command had no other choice but to announce this nomination on 19 September.