Seite - 474 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

474 War Aims and Central Europe between Pszczyna and Cieszyn (Teschen) were so big that it was almost inevitable that serious disagreements would arise. Since each of the general staff chiefs believed fur- thermore that he had been insulted by the other, an absolute breach occurred. This breach, which was occasionally viewed as a case of the Chief of the Austrian General Staff not having wanted to back down due to a personal foible, was far more than just a grievance over a pet issue, and there were also other people involved and other interests at stake than just those of the Chief of the Imperial and Royal General Staff. First and foremost was Emperor Franz Joseph, who had accepted developments in the Balkans but had regarded them from the outset with anything but pleasure. The war against Serbia had been ‘his’ war and not that of the Germans ! Too many people, too many goods and above all too many emotions had been invested in this region both before and during the war. The Emperor, however, had taken a stand and invited Field Marshal Mackensen to a court banquet on 24 September, before the start of the campaign. Yet it was only a question of draping the already fixed chain of command with the approval of the ‘Most Supreme’. Of greater importance here was the visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II, who was also invited to a court banquet. The two emperors could congratulate each other on the victories. And in order to make the thanks of the House of Austria completely obvious, Mackensen was once more granted an audience on 6 December and permitted to report for an hour on the campaign. Ultimately, however, the Emperor was interested not least in how things would proceed, and for this reason Conrad, Archduke Friedrich and Tisza were granted repeated audiences during Octo- ber and November. For the time being, none of them could provide a definite answer. At the beginning of December, Count Tisza travelled to Berlin. After his return he immediately submitted a written report to Franz Joseph on the information he had received in Berlin and the impressions he had gathered.1121 Kaiser Wilhelm and his entourage, according to Tisza, massively overestimated the successes in Serbia and underestimated on the other hand the ‘difficulties and dangers’ that still awaited the Central Powers. It was dependent exclusively on the moderation of the war aims of the Central Powers as to whether the Entente would be prepared to make peace, and not on military successes. ‘A truth that we can disregard all the less, since in spite of all the heroics and brilliant successes, the moment of exhaustion must occur earlier in our case than in that of the enemy.’ Tisza had certainly endeavoured for his comments in Berlin not to be understood as war weariness, but he would in any case have been una- ble to curb German optimism. One thing had pleased Tisza : the ‘scornfully dismissive assessment of Romania’ by the German Kaiser. Berlin had furthermore dropped the plan aired weeks before to conclude a special peace with Serbia for the price of Albania, which was to fall to Serbia. Now Wilhelm II had spoken only of the dissolution and di- vision of Serbia  – as Count Alexander Hoyos had once done. Tisza, however, regarded this as the wrong path to take. Serbia should not simply be completely dissolved and