Seite - 477 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

Winter War in Russia and Montenegro 477 The final weeks of 1915 were characterised on the north-eastern front by the Russians, with a largely unvarying troop distribution, almost entirely discontinuing their attack- ing activities and by the Austro-Hungarians also no longer possessing much in the way of offensive capacity. They limited themselves to local thrusts. The sojourn in the ‘en- trenched position’ and the clear situation in the Balkans allowed the question to move into focus as to how things should proceed in 1916 on the Imperial and Royal fronts. In the Operations Division of the Army High Command, specialists in the Russia and the Italy Groups sought to force through their respective concepts. Both pointed to priorities that they believed they had discovered in ‘their’ theatre of war, whereby the re- searcher for the Italy Group, Schneller, doubtlessly had a compelling argument at hand when he explained that the Italians were carrying out one offensive after another and that it was time to give more attention to the south-western theatre of war and above all send more forces to it. On the other hand, numerous things had been set in motion precisely as a result of the strained relationship with the German Empire. Falkenhayn also attempted to bring about a relief of German troops on the north-eastern front, first in order once more to disentangle them and to again begin a separate conduct of opera- tions, and second because he wanted to send all available forces against Verdun in order to start the bloody battle that he hoped would bring about a turnaround in the west. But something else played a role in Falkenhayn’s deliberations. He had been in- formed by Conrad that the Chief of the Imperial and Royal General Staff was con- sidering an offensive against Italy with a considerable force. Conrad had also once more requested the dispatch of German troops, troops that Falkenhayn promptly and roundly denied him. The Germans had experienced the fact that their allies did not eas- ily give in, however, and Falkenhayn already mistrusted Conrad’s intentions in general. Therefore, he not only wanted to make no German troops available for the south-west- ern front, but also demanded the transfer of German troops on the Russian front and their replacement with Austro-Hungarian army components. In this way, additional Imperial and Royal troops would be tied up in Russia and it would be made impossible for Austria-Hungary to go it alone against Montenegro and, above all, Italy. At precisely the same moment as the severance of personal relations between Falk- enhayn and Conrad, heavy Russian attacks commenced on the north-eastern front, which increased to become the Neujahrsschlacht (New Year’s Battle). It lasted from 20 December 1915 to 26 January 1916. This time, the Austro-Hungarian armies achieved a remarkable defensive success, which was received in the Army High Command with particular satisfaction. The confidence and the trust in the capability of the Imperial and Royal troops, which had already sunk considerably, rose again enormously. Sch- neller, the Italy specialist, also reported a change in the tactical views within the Russia Group.1126 A battle technique had namely contributed to the defence of the attacks that was based on experiences that had been made above all in the west and that constituted