Seite - 487 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Vision of Peace with Victory 487 would submit the resignation of the Hungarian government. Since no-one wanted this, nothing remained but to commence the compensation negotiations in the form desired by Hungary. Central Europe had fallen foul of Hungary, and ultimately there was nei- ther a settlement nor a Central Europe in accordance with German or Austrian wishes. After only a few months, the idea of Central Europe was dead. In September and October 1915, the culmination point had also in this respect been crossed. There then came a phase of consolidation and the desperate attempt to reignite the debate. Instead, a nationalist radicalisation began that made large-scale solutions redundant. Ultimately, nothing more remained of the Central Europe euphoria than a desire for the annex- ation of Austria by Germany. The ‘Central Europeans’ had had a peace order in mind, but it required peace with victory on the part of the Central Powers. And this reflects one of the most eminent weaknesses of all these constructions, since how should a peace order be erected on a foundation of suppression and dismemberment ? The Vision of Peace with Victory As mentioned earlier, the defeat of Serbia stimulated the discussion on the future path of the Central Powers and the war aims in a special way, and it was now more so than ever a question of the future of Austria-Hungary. As early as autumn 1915, Conrad had intervened with several position papers on the war aims and especially on those in the Balkans. On New Year’s Eve, he temporarily concluded his works on this subject.1160 His deliberations presupposed in a particular fashion a peace with victory. If in 1914 it had been stated all too clearly that Serbia should not be dismembered or even very much reduced in size, and also that Russia should suffer no territorial losses, matters looked rather different now. Conrad outlined in his New Year’s Eve position paper1161 the future fate of Poland, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania, and he also concluded in the case of Italy that no peace could be made on the basis of the status quo.1162 Not only that : since October 1915, Conrad had repeatedly extended the war aims. For Russia, he saw these targets eastwards of Lublin and Siedlce ; in the case of Serbia and Montenegro, they were located somewhere on the Greek border ; Italy, however, should be forced back as far as the ‘terra firma’ of Venice. Specifically, Conrad described it as desirable ‘if the entire Polish territory were to fall to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ; but I would still regard a division of the same with Germany (for instance in line with the borders of 1795) as more suitable than a return of this territory to Russia. If a re- striction of Russian power to this effect were to come about, this would also indirectly break Serbian resistance.’ With regard to Serbia, Conrad saw the only solution as a complete incorporation of the same into the Dual Monarchy. Weeks earlier he had said to Falkenhayn that Serbia should merely be brought into a position that made it clear