Seite - 488 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

488 War Aims and Central Europe that it had Austria-Hungary and no-one else to thank for everything. Now, however, he went further and acted in accordance with the well-known principle : appetite comes with eating. ‘The major importance that the unification of all southern Slav territories in the Monarchy possesses for the latter’s status as a great power and in particular for its status as a naval power’, noted Conrad, almost went without saying. In this point there was subsequently a type of accord between Conrad and Tisza, who both opposed the German intentions, which were also occasionally heard in Austria, to partition and dismember Serbia. In fact, however, Tisza and Conrad wanted not less, but more. ‘An independent Montenegro appears far less dangerous than an independent Serbia’, as Conrad continued, ‘provided that it is not granted any coastal possessions. […] How- ever, an incorporation of Montenegro appears more advantageous, also for the eco- nomic prosperity of this country itself.’ In the case of Italy, Conrad demanded that it be returned to its pre-1866 borders.1163 Now there was no mention of a special peace with Russia or with Serbia ; instead, it was a question of victory and defeat of the enemy. When both Minister Burián and War Minister Krobatin appeared with moderate proposals and found far less ambitious war aims to be sufficient, Conrad once more turned to the Emperor and confronted him with the claim that being satisfied with less would constitute ‘a severe impairment of the interests of the Monarchy and an eminent danger for its future’.1164 Conrad wanted to have one thing duly noted : the configuration of the alliance with Germany was an indispensable prerequisite for being able to rejoice in this victor’s prize. Since around the turn of the year  – following the defeat of Serbia and in view of the hopeless position of Montenegro  – for the first time in this war the moment had come to give a signal for how armistice and peace negotiations were conducted in a world war and in view of the sacrifices made, what was said about Serbia and Montenegro was of the most far-reaching political significance. It became clear that the Army High Command did not focus on revenge but was certainly ready to dictate the harshest conditions. A session of the Joint Council of Ministers on 7 January 1916 also provided the opportunity to discuss the question of armistice and peace conditions in the case of Serbia and Montenegro.1165 Conrad, who was called in for this session of the Council of Ministers, left no doubt about the radical demands of the military. But his view was by no means shared by everyone. Following the session of the Council of Ministers, Conrad took stock and wrote to Bolfras : ‘The in total eight-hour-long conference in the Foreign Ministry left me with the very sad impression that whilst Stürgkh, Koer- ber and Krobatin voted for the annexation of Serbia and Montenegro, Tisza is com- pletely against it and the Foreign Minister regrettably lets himself be taken in tow by the former. I expressed the opinion […] I have held for years, to the effect that only the annexation of Serbia and also Montenegro can liberate the Monarchy from the