Seite - 508 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

508 South Tyrol : The End of an Illusion (I) to capitulate. If this were to happen, 250,000 men would become free to fight on other fronts almost immediately. All attempts by Conrad at the beginning of February 1916 to convince Falkenhayn of the necessity of a joint offensive against Italy came to nothing. The final discussion on the matter, a conversation at Pszczyna on 3 February, also produced no result. A few days later, Conrad must have felt downright deceived, since Falkenhayn had declined to tell him that he had made preparations for a major attack at Verdun, which began nine days after this discussion, on 12 February 1916. Conrad felt all the more moti- vated to now present the ally with a fait accompli. What then so aptly became known as a ‘punitive expedition’ could equally be interpreted as a punishment for German arrogance. The first plans related to the amassing of the troops. They were to be taken from the Tyrolean front, from the north-eastern front and above all from the Isonzo front, in order to create two armies with around 200,000 men. Then the overall command was established, as well as the supply of guns, ammunition and war materials of all kinds. However, the fact was ignored that for a war in the high mountains, other requirements would have to be met than in the lowlands. Clearly, this made no particular difference to anyone. It corresponded to the theory of warfare according to which occupation of the heights determined who dominated the valleys. Thanks to the electric train that had been developed by Ferdinand Porsche, the heavy artillery was sufficiently mobile to be brought even to remote regions, and as far as the soldiers were concerned, experience of fighting in the mountains was not regarded as necessary. After all, it had emerged during the course of the war that soldiers from the plains of East Central Europe, who before the war had never seen a mountain before, had irreproachably proven their worth in mountainous regions. Why should it not be possible to conquer the massifs that separated the Imperial and Royal armies in the Dolomites from the northern Ital- ian plain ? It was even suggested that Turkish troops be used in South Tyrol, but these considerations were never put into practice, since although there were no doubts that the soldiers of the Sultan would be able to cope with the hardships, it would have been necessary to provide them with all the equipment required for war in the mountains.1198 For all the considerations relating to an offensive from Tyrol, initially still under winter conditions, it is clear that other experiences of mountain warfare and the huge difficulties in mustering and breaking out of the mountains played no role. This is even more extraordinary since almost all those responsible for the plans, including Conrad in particular, had a great deal of experience in conducting operations in the Tyrol region. Finally, the fighting in the Carpathians of 1915 could also have contributed to gaining additional insights, which Italy could not possess, or at least not to the same degree. And these experiences included not least the fact that cold and snow were factors that were almost impossible to plan for. And yet it was also not taken into account that in