Seite - 523 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

I n the garden of Moscow’s Novodevichy Convent, close to the Moskva River, there is the grave of a Russian general whose name has become a synonym for the war in the east and above all for summer 1916 : Aleksei A. Brusilov. The grave is marked by a simple stone made of red-brown marble and surrounded by a wrought iron fence. Although the text is a little faded, it is clear that even the Communist regime showed respect to this Tsarist troop leader, all the more since he placed himself at the disposal of the Bolshevik regime. For several weeks in June and July 1916, it had seemed as though Brusilov had it in his power to give the war a sudden turnaround in favour of Russia. And that was to be recognised across regimes. The Brusilov Offensive On 6 December 1915, by means of an invitation from the French generalissimo Gen- eral Joffre, senior representatives of the allied high commands had gathered together in Joffre’s headquarters in Chantilly in order to discuss war plans for 1916. They had agreed to launch an attack at the earliest opportunity after March 1916 against the fronts of the Central Powers. This was designed to prevent the Germans and Austrians continuing to exploit the advantage of the inner line. The allied timing, however, had been mixed up by the beginning of the German attack on Verdun on 21 February 1916. All that could be attempted was to commence a relief offensive. The Italians did this with little success at the Fifth Battle of the Isonzo. The Russians, in their attempt to fulfil the pledge made at Chantilly, also suffered a heavy defeat in their attacks against the German Eastern Army in the so-called Lake Naroch Offensive between 18 March and the end of April. The offensive had been poorly prepared and the attempt had been made to carry it out by using tactical approaches that were in fact long since obsolete. The ‘steamroller’ had served out its time. And the strategic aim of releasing pressure on the allied front in France was missed by a long way and with considerable loss of life. Then, however, Aleksei Brusilov took over the Russian south-western front, a general who went to work with a very different aptitude than the average Russian military leaders from the cut of an Aleksei N. Kuropatkin or an Aleksei Evert, to name just two examples. Brusilov furthermore received enough time to prepare his offensive. Now, for the first time, the Russians also proceeded in such a way that they made use of experiences gathered on the front in Flanders, and in this way could offset those dis-