Seite - 526 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

526 Lutsk : The End of an Illusion (II) Command was eventually informed on detail about the Russian troop deployment and the impending attack. It also intercepted the Italian distress signal, which requested a commencement of the attack as soon as possible in order to provide relief in South Tyrol. But a last ditch effort to improve the Austro-Hungarian positions was not made until the end of May. Everything nevertheless appeared sufficiently prepared when the Brusilov Offensive broke loose on 4 June 1916. On the first day, Cieszyn (Teschen) still believed that the Imperial and Royal Army was heading for another victory in a defensive battle, but then the Russian artillery fire increased. ‘With a barrage of unforeseen strength, the Russians assailed an area of 500 paces deep’, reported the Adjutant General of Archduke Friedrich, Count Herberstein, on 20 June to the Emperor, ‘and affected not only the actual fighting positions, whose crews were generally buried under the loose sand and topsoil in the shellproof dugouts, but also the held-back reserves, who in many cases suffered severe losses even before their deployment.’1232 The nerves of the Imperial and Royal troops who had never be- fore been under fire were soon at breaking point. ‘Aside from the fact that the strong wire obstacles were destroyed by the enormous impact of this barrage, as a result of the dryness and lack of wind a huge, thick cloud of dust and smoke, often intermixed with asphyxiating gases, hovered the whole time over the entire fire zone, removed all visibility and frequently impaired breathing.’1233 On the western front, in France and Belgium, such a barrage, and likewise poison gas, would no longer have been classified as extraordinary. In the east, however, this was something new. When the Russian storm troopers ran out of their trenches at close range, they succeeded in successfully storming the first Austro-Hungarian line. The deployment of the army and corps re- serves did not take effect ; there was a withdrawal to the second line and then the retreat to the third line began. The leadership of the 4th Army failed, and even the bravery of individual commanders and troops could change nothing about the situation. This marked the beginning of the calamity.1234 The Army High Command, as mentioned earlier, had admittedly been alarmed for a time, but had composed itself again as a result of the reports of the army commanders and the confidence at the front. Conrad recognised as early as 4 June, however, that the Russian offensive was something different to that which had been known since spring 1915. The celebrations on the occasion of the 60th birthday of Archduke Friedrich were not allowed to be disturbed, and offered up a torchlight procession and ovations that were worthy of the occasion. In the meanwhile, the Russians had discovered the first weak point of the front and concentrated on the section of the front of the 2nd Infantry Division, which consisted primarily of Viennese, Lower Austrians and Czechs, and the 70th Honvéd (Hungarian standing army) Infantry Division. Brusilov had hammered the idea into the heads of his subordinate commanders that they should pay particular attention to the sections of the front, where ‘Slav’ troop units would show less inclina-