Seite - 549 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The ‘Joint Supreme War Command’ 549 of the Bulgarian-Austro-Hungarian-Turkish conduct of the war. His executive organ for this purpose is the Chief of the General Staff of the German Field Army. The in- dependence of the individual allied army commands within their particular sphere of action should only be affected by this regulation to the extent that the great common cause requires it. […] If orders of the joint war command are issued, they must under all circumstances be followed.’1293 This was still a draft, and the date was also fictitious. When Conrad returned, he ‘snarled and raged’.1294 He immediately telegraphed the Military Chancellery that under these circumstances the Army High Command could no longer carry responsibility, and that it was a political matter of the greatest import, a matter that was ‘decisive for the future relationship between Austria-Hungary and Germany, for the great power status of the Monarchy and for its independence’. This was certainly true at its core, for it was clear that as a result of the interlocking of Ger- man and Austro-Hungarian troops the influence of the German Kaiser would inevita- bly be incomparably greater on the latter than, for example, on the Turks in the area of Baghdad or in the Caucasus. Conrad still believed he had a silent ally who could play a role in efforts to prevent the joint supreme command, namely the heir to the throne Archduke Karl. He had repeatedly made anti-German remarks and was least of all inclined to accept Ger- man dominance. In spite of a personally good relationship with his Senior Chief of Staff, General von Seeckt, Karl made it clear in mid-August that he was not pleased about the direct contact between Seeckt and Falkenhayn, since in the process the Aus- tro-Hungarian Army High Command was neutralised. As he wrote in a handwritten memorandum that he gave to the Adjutant General of Archduke Friedrich, however, this was ‘ominous’.1295 He did not want any German chief of staff, as it was ; he regarded it as patronisation and was strengthened in this view by his Deputy Chief of Staff and someone who enjoyed his trust, Colonel Baron Waldstätten. But the heir to the throne did not want to risk relations with the German Empire in any way, and he furthermore did not have such a relationship to Conrad that he would have sought an understanding. Consequently, those people remained decisive who campaigned for the joint supreme command. And here Count Herberstein and the aide-de-camp of Archduke Friedrich, Baron Lorx, came ever more to the fore. On 22 August, Herberstein noted in his diary : ‘The question of a unified supreme command for all fronts under German leadership occupies me most of all and I can already see that my ideas, which I have propagated for months, will now be carried out after all. As a result of events, however, we might now be forced to do this, whereas it would have been a completely different story if we had proposed this voluntarily at an earlier stage. The fact that the unified command must be led by the Germans  – Kaiser Wilhelm  – is self-evident, since Germany is the most powerful state and has a monarch who stands in the field, is energetic and in full possession of his [mental and physical] strength !’1296 Herberstein added : ‘His Imperial