Seite - 595 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

Hohenzollern against Habsburg 595 Tisza at its head, is pursuing narrow Magyar policies ; in spite of all the grandiloquent words, it knows no generous principles and it is lacking in any understanding for the common adversity and for the common higher purpose. Here as well the personality is lacking who dictates from above the preservation of common interests.’ Hungary, he continued, was striving to loosen the bond with Austria ; Hungarian chauvinism was blossoming, but the blame for this lay with Austria as well. This report was also part of the balance of the war year 1916. The German Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg furnished this analysis of his ambassador in Vienna with the remark that it was in no way exaggerated and a meeting should take place at all costs between Kaiser Wilhelm and the heir to the Austrian throne Archduke Karl, in order to provide redress. Again, as in the case of the disempowerment of the Army High Command and Emperor Franz Joseph by means of the creation of the Joint Su- preme War Command, Berlin no longer paid any heed to the Monarch in the Hofburg Palace, but instead looked primarily to his successor. In Tschirschky’s report it was blatantly obvious that scores were being settled with Hungary, since this Hungary showed itself to be anything but approachable when it came to German desires for a reorganisation of Central Europe. Budapest had instead the clear concept in mind of a change of emphasis in the Habsburg Monarchy, which emerged ever more as Count Tisza’s personal war aim. On this topic he had written a ‘top secret’ letter to Minister Burián months earlier : ‘The existence of the Hungarian national state is completely intertwined with the great power status of the Monar- chy ; on the other hand, even this great power status cannot be imagined without its most solid pillar : the living force of the Hungarian state. […] If one is not completely blinded by prejudice, then after the experience of this war, one cannot call into question that not only the energy of the Magyars in an ethnographic sense but the solid fabric of the Hungarian national state constitute the greatest living force and the most solid pillar of the power status of the Monarchy.’1372 Germany, however, intended least of all to support ‘the living force […] of the Magyars’. Thus, a vicious circle began to form. This German Empire, which as an ally had begun to play such a huge role for the Habsburg Monarchy in the war, was regarded at the same time as an eminent threat. It was precisely in Hungary that this dichotomy must be felt most strongly, since the critical situation created by the entry of Romania into the war could only be rectified with German help. The German Empire, however, showed no inclination to promote Hungarian desires for supremacy. Having said that, Count Tisza, who represented to the outside world the politics of upgrading Hungary, had to be for many reasons more welcome to the German Empire than any alternative candidate. Hungary demanded perhaps more loudly than the Austrian half of the Em- pire clearly defined objectives in this war and by no means wanted to see them realised in the from of some territorial gains and alleged strategic improvements, but rather