Seite - 597 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

Hohenzollern against Habsburg 597 gramme, by contrast, appears to me to be the complete subjugation of our Monarchy to the German leadership both in military and in political terms. He is quoted as saying : ‘Germany’s victory prize in this war must be Austria’  – I have heard this, as a rule, from very informed sources, to whom I am also indebted for the following information.’ He then described the events that had led to Falkenhayn’s fall and the formation of the third German Supreme Army Command. The consequences for Austria-Hungary had been felt immediately. In the Polish question, there had been an about-turn. Austria was supposed to hand over to Germany the territories under its administration. The ‘harmless concessions’ granted by Austria to the Polish Legion had been acknowledged with indignation by the Germans and the legion had been immediately transferred to the German sphere of influence near Baranovichi. ‘All these things happen by virtue of the power of command conferred on Kaiser Wilhelm  – as the Germans interpret the concession that was made by us on the occasion of the settlement of the command issue. This whole command settlement is said to have been the work of Ludendorff, with the aim of bringing to bear the power of Germany on us in practice. At the time, on the occasion of the first demand of this nature, I warned against this, but we are inferior to the agitation carried out on all sides and bowed to this Caudium yoke ; the consequences did not fail to materialise. Militarily, this subordination was superfluous ; it damaged our prestige, but above all our military and political importance ; this was not considered by those people who urged this [course of action] at the time. In doing so, they did the Monarchy a disservice and aggravated even more the already difficult position of the Army High Command. It is no trifle, on the one hand, to have to con- stantly claim German help as a result of the inadequacy of our military means, but on the other hand to have to sustain the military prestige of the Monarchy. It cannot be denied that the Germans abundantly provide these means, also now under Ludendorff, but they certainly do nothing for free, since they are cold, ruthless reckoners ; it is part of their system to hold us up as the weak, the inferior [and] to belittle our achieve- ments, in order to deprive us of any right to make demands. They are supported in this by our public opinion, our audience, which falls to its knees adoringly in the presence of anything alien and delights in the undignified disparagement of everything that is its own  – but also by those cliques, individuals and parties, whose personal or political aspirations include voicing snide criticism of our situation, [and] undermining the rep- utation of our leading authorities ; the part open, part concealed agitation against the Army High Command belongs in this same category. […] I find it bitter […] to have to accept how our army is infiltrated with German commanders and German troops.’ This had begun, according to Conrad, in the Carpathian winter of 1914/15 and had steadily continued, and it had ultimately been the result of, above all, German reporting that the achievements of the Imperial and Royal troops were depreciated and those of the Germans instead allowed to shine, ‘wherefore they exploit the circumstance created