Seite - 654 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

654 Emperor Karl Spitzmüller most urgently advised against this and he wanted under no circumstances to lend himself to this end. Nonetheless, he was tasked with forming a government. He endeavoured for a week to bring together a cabinet, and he was ultimately successful. At this point he was contacted by the man who was considered one of the Emper- or’s closest confidants, Count Ottokar Czernin. According to Spitzmüller’s notations, Count Czernin said that ‘the “poor, little Emperor” required at the beginning of his government special custody’ and Spitzmüller could not provide him with this. ‘It was furthermore imperative in the highest interests of the state to solve the Bohemian question by taking the octroi route’, and Spitzmüller was not authorised for this task in view of his political past. His task could ‘be seen at most as a one-month stopgap’. The bottom line was that Czernin informed Spitzmüller that he, Czernin, would become prime minister. Spitzmüller had understood. However, the next day Czernin was told by the Emperor that he wanted him as foreign minister. Now Spitzmüller’s shares had risen again. But the experiences of not even a week induced the designated prime min- ister to hand back to the Emperor the task of forming a government. On 20 December, Count Heinrich Clam-Martinic was appointed Imperial and Royal Prime Minister. He succeeded in forming a cabinet within the space of 24 hours. He was only the prelude, however, to radical changes in personnel. The Emperor brought those men into his entourage from whom he hoped for the realisation of his ideas. It was not only a question of trust but even more one of identification. Those appointed by Karl felt primarily obligated to the new ruler, whilst those leaving office must have considered themselves appointees of the old Emperor. The break with Koer- ber, two days later from Burián and, finally, from Archduke Friedrich and Conrad was intended to make it clear that Karl wanted to draw a line under the past. He could not foresee, however, that the one-time replacement of certain people would not be the end of the matter. Instead, a process began that increasingly accelerated and finally became like nothing else an expression of hopelessness. Regardless of who it was : ultimately, no-one could offer solutions that would guarantee the survival of the Monarchy. It is understandable that the Allies in particular followed the personnel changes and events in Austria-Hungary with special interest. Perhaps the opportunity for a separate peace would arise. Some things were known about the new Emperor, whilst other things were learned and then garnished with assumptions that were flatly wrong. It was correct that Karl was a decided opponent of German ideas for Central Europe. He regarded the alliance with Germany as a wartime necessity, though not as some- thing of a lasting nature. A Central European federation would place Austria-Hungary (or just Austria ?) in a position of ‘dependency à la Bavaria’, in the view of the Allied analysts.1486 France also understood a remark made by Prince Zdzisław Lubomirski to mean that there had been a ‘Renaissance of Slavism’ in Vienna, since the new Emperor had separated himself from the group of leading personalities that orientated itself