Seite - 687 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

The Conrad Crisis 687 thought that it would be no particularly difficult task to dismiss a Chief of the Gen- eral Staff. However, there were also potentially unpleasant consequences. In Germany, Moltke, Falkenhayn and finally, Hindenburg, had been in office. However, due to the length of his period of service in this role, from 1906 to 1911, and again from 1912 to 1917, Conrad had become such an epitome of the genial military leader that his removal would surely have a very different signal effect. Everyone knew that he was responsible for the military leadership of this war. He had been the subject of more or less veiled criticism, which had indeed been extremely harsh : for his remoteness from the troops, his disregard of the number of casualties involved in his style of waging the war, his interventions in domestic policy, and even for his personal relations. Even so, when asked for example whether a change in the operational leadership would not be appropriate, Colonel Baronet Theodor von Zeynek, newly appointed by Emperor Karl in January as Chief of the Quartermaster Division, told the Monarch in his first audience, knowing full well that the Emperor wished to hear a different response, that any officer could be replaced with the exception of Conrad, who was ‘the outstanding embodiment of leadership in Europe’.1567 This statement reflects the excessive approval and respect in which Conrad was held by the mass of officers. The new Chief of the Military Chancellery of the Emperor, Marterer, was one of the few who knew no defer- ence. He was keen to play his part in ensuring that the man with the ‘godlike self-image’ was replaced.1568 The Emperor had certainly taken into account the special regard in which Conrad was held, and had therefore saved his dismissal until last. First, everything else was to be reorganised along new lines. On 22 February, Marterer was called to the Emperor, who wished to discuss Conrad’s removal. Karl complained to Marterer that he could no longer work with Conrad. ‘He annoys him too much, does silly things, is one-sided and allows himself to be guided by those around him.’1569 However, it was clear to him that it was not only Conrad’s dismissal that was at issue, but also that a new Chief of the General Staff was needed. Marterer proposed Alfred Krauß, who had not only made a name for himself at Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front, but who also  – like Conrad  – was a politicising general. However, when Archduke Eugen was asked, he warned against Krauß, whom he considered to be very able, but equally disliked. As such, this would not necessarily have been a particular handicap for a Chief of the General Staff, although Krauß could certainly not be regarded as submissive. This was the more important point. Karl therefore opted for a man whom he knew from his role as Army Group Commander on the Romanian front, General Arthur Arz von Straus- senburg. An apolitical, inconspicuous and above all, pliant man, he was to be Conrad’s successor. At this moment, the extent to which the high-ranking generals of Austria-Hungary had been used up in this war also became crystal clear. In 1914, there was still specula-