Seite - 698 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

698 The Consequences of the Russian February Revolution tral Powers. But even the appeal to the Russian soldiers to oppose a possible advance of the Germans and the Austrians to Petrograd and far into the heart of Russia could not accomplish any change in the situation at the front and in the base zone. At the front, the indications of the revolution on 15 March and in the days that followed were noticeable least of all. The war diaries of the Imperial and Royal divi- sions and corps contain corresponding entries only from 21 March onwards. They had been forewarned, however, since a report from their superior commanders had already reached the divisions on 15 March, according to which a ‘military revolution’ had taken place in Petrograd. Evidently, however, the Russian troops at the front were also with- out definite news for days on end. Deserters then related the unusual degree of unrest. Prisoners reported that a regimental commander had described the Tsar as a ‘coward’, since he had allegedly attempted to flee to Germany and was being pursued.1586 During the days that followed, the news was circulated among the Russian soldiers to the effect that a type of president was ruling in Petrograd who had proclaimed equal rights and an alleviation of military penalties.1587 Only in April 1917 did the information increase. For a period of time there was a ceasefire, and finally there was only routine harass- ment fire on the part of the artillery. In the positions of the Central Powers, shouts were heard and white and red rags were seen. They allowed for the conclusion that the revolution had spread to the front. Leaflets then appeared, and eventually it could be observed on numerous parts of the front that the Russians emerged from their trenches without weapons and attempted to fraternise with their opponents. This was often crowned with success, and at precisely these moments at least the Austro-Hungarian command authorities were aware that this was by all means a double-edged affair : the phenomena among the Russian troops, the waning of the will to fight and the signs of disintegration were naturally met with sympathy ; the decomposition was to be encour- aged for obvious reasons. Conversely, the fraternisation was nothing that would have imparted only a one-sided disgust with the war and a singular feeling of dismay. The matter was recognised as problematic at the moment when it became clear that those who wanted to fraternise were also pursuing the revolutionisation of the soldiers of the Central Powers. Delegations of Russian soldiers travelled through no-man’s-land and attempted to begin negotiations. They spoke of removing their officers and electing soldiers’ councils. The government of Duke Lvov did seem to be a good thing to them, but it could not be allowed to continue the war. The soldiers no longer wanted to attack and proposed instead that the Germans and the Austrians also abandon the fight and begin a revo- lution themselves. In this way, the war could be ended very quickly. On 6 April 1917, therefore, the Austro-Hungarian army commanders issued orders that involved the re- jection of all attempts at ingratiation. Such attempts were expected above all during the Easter holidays.1588 However, since they wanted to give the Russians the opportunity to