Seite - 765 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

Peace Feelers 765 Emperor’s Karl’s attempts to make peace that the enemy coalition was close to crum- bling. If strong pressure were exerted on Austria-Hungary, it would collapse. A subse- quent separate peace with the Dual Monarchy would then, in a type of domino effect, force Bulgaria, Turkey and finally also the German Empire to their knees. Only in this way, as Lloyd George believed, would a lasting peace in Europe be possible, since such a peace would have to impose conditions on Germany that would decisively paralyse its offensive power.1789 The thrust of the Allies was thus retained and the attempt was made to offset the loss of Russia. With the end of tsarism in Russia, Serbia had lost its most important backer. It had been Russia that had persuaded Serbia to reject the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum in July 1914, Russia that had formulated ambitious war aims with Serbia, and Russia that had also attempted to safeguard Serbia’s interests during the negotiations on the entry of Italy into the war. Russia’s Provisional Government let it very soon be known, how- ever, that a Kingdom of Serbia was of no concern to it, and merely a Yugoslavian solu- tion based on democratic principles would find support.1790 The Serbian government in exile was forced to adapt itself to these altered circumstances. Prime Minister Pašić invited representatives of the so-called Yugoslav Committee to Corfu. In mid-June, the delegations of the Committee and the Serbian government in exile met on the island and negotiated there until 20 July 1917. By then, they had reached an understanding, with which the creation of a Yugoslav state was agreed on. Croatian circles in America disagreed with the agreement, since they feared that it would not contain sufficient guarantees against Serbian attempts at centralisation and supremacy. But the ‘European’ Croat leaders in exile, Trumbić and Šupilo, were thoroughly satisfied with it. With the Corfu accord, things had changed for Serbs, as well as for Croats and Slovenes. From then on, Serbia wanted and was to fight not only to reconquer its lost tracts of land and, if need be, incorporate additional areas into its territory, but also for an independent Yugoslavia and the unification of Croats and Slovenes. And the Yugoslav or Croatian and Slovenian representatives no longer aimed at an Austria organised trialistically or howsoever, but instead at partition. The Entente, however, focussed completely on its own peace with victory and appeared to be further away from achieving a negotiated peace than ever. Those in Austria-Hungary who wanted to pursue a policy of peace got repeatedly caught up in the intricacies of alliance politics and in the snares of domestic affairs. This applied in particular to Emperor Karl. In Czernin he had a Foreign Minister who took a view that ultimately levelled out at a policy of status quo. On the other hand, it was precisely Czernin who had moved over in June and July 1917 to influencing not only German internal politics but, even more so, those of Austria. In doing so, he drew on German components and ultimately entered so thoroughly into his own political game that he banked on the Germans even more so than his predecessors. He once compared