Seite - 777 - in THE FIRST WORLD WAR - and the End of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914 – 1918

Operation ‘Loyalty to Arms’ 777 point, and when the reader already believes that they know how the story will end, a moment of final tension occurs, when everything again appears in a different light, and the conclusion of the plot that had appeared so inevitable until that point suddenly takes a dramatic new turn. Until this moment of final tension, too, dies down. Operation ‘Loyalty to Arms’ In order to overcome the unclear situation in the alliance, thoughts began to be aired in the German Empire of taking a harder line with Austria-Hungary through intensified military commitment. This purpose was to be served by an offensive against Italy, in which German troops would also take part, in order to remove from this theatre of the war the sense that it was a private affair for the Imperial and Royal Army. This was a turnaround in German policy in that until the autumn of 1917, German diplomats had repeatedly attempted to mediate between Italy and Austria-Hungary by refer- ring to the fact that Austria would only have to relinquish Trento (Trient) for Italy to be willing to conclude a peace. At the same time, the German readiness was also a military novelty, since from 1915 to 1917, the German Empire had after all refrained from supporting Austria with troops at the Isonzo or in South Tyrol  – aside from the episode with the ‘Alpine Corps’. Now, preparations were to be made to defeat Italy in a joint offensive. This would also prove that the Entente, and Britain in particular, were incapable of effectively protecting Italy. Perhaps the Apennine state would be ready for peace  – or a revolution might break out, which was also considered a possibility.1814 Furthermore, it was felt in Germany that by conquering Italian soil, Austrian covetous- ness would be awakened, thus automatically causing it to abandon its formula of ‘peace without annexations’.1815 The notion of conducting a fatal attack against Italy was as old as the war against Italy itself. In 1916, the Austro-Hungarian solo campaign had failed. Then, there had been months when the Imperial and Royal armies were fully occupied with staving off the Italian offensives at the Isonzo at almost regular intervals. And this was becoming increasingly difficult. Nonetheless, the Operations Division of the Imperial and Royal Army High Command was already again working intensively on plans for a new ma- jor offensive. However, it was based on the assumption that between twelve and 16 German divisions and 42 artillery regiments would be involved, which they had been informed would be available from April 1917. However, on 25 February, Field Marshal Hindenburg announced that the situation in the west prevented the deployment of German troops in Italy. When, following his dismissal in February 1917, Conrad von Hötzendorf had be- come Army Group Commander for the Italian front, the post had been made palatable